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Even as American attention is focused on Iraq’s struggles to rebuild its politi-
cal and legal systems in the face of violent sectarian divisions, another fractured
society – Kosovo – has just begun negotiations to resolve the question of its polit-
ical independence. The persistent ethnic divisions that have obstructed Kosovo’s
efforts to establish multi-ethnic “rule of law” offer lessons in transitional justice
for Iraq and other states.
In Kosovo today, two parallel judicial systems each claim absolute and exclusive
jurisdiction over the province. One system is sponsored by the United Nations ad-
ministration in Kosovo and is mostly, although not exclusively, staffed by Kosovar
Albanians. The other system, run primarily by Kosovar Serbians, is essentially a
set of courts-in-exile, the remnants of the previous judicial system that existed
before the Serbian government was forced out of Kosovo by NATO bombing in
1999. The parallel courts present a transitional justice issue that is as crucial
to rebuilding Kosovo’s post-conflict society as convening a truth commission or
conducting criminal trials. On one level, the existence of the parallel courts is a
manifestation of the ongoing political dispute over sovereignty. For the residents
of Kosovo, the lack of any recognition of judgments between these systems has
also created legal chaos in their everyday lives. Conflicting judgments have been
issued in civil cases, and criminal defendants are subject to prosecution and pun-
ishment in both systems. The palpable injustices that result from these conflicting
judgments and repeated trials are undermining confidence in the ongoing process
of legal and political transition.
This article undertakes an assessment of Kosovo’s parallel systems and of the ex-
isting legal models for recognition and enforcement of judgments, with the aim of
proposing an appropriate framework for Kosovo to recognize the Serbian parallel
judgments. In my survey of the relevant national and international models, I find
that each strives to strike a balance between two competing values: (1) certainty in
the finality and consistency of legal judgments and (2) ensuring those judgments’
essential fairness. Using these two values as a guide, I assess whether and how the
existing models might be adapted to Kosovo’s context, concluding that the proper
balance between legal certainty and fairness will permit categorical recognition of
most parallel civil judgments, but will require case by case, discretionary review
of criminal judgments. Finally, from this analysis, I develop a set of factors for
other transitioning states to consider when faced with judgments from ethnic and
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Kosovo1 today, two parallel judicial systems each claim absolute and 
exclusive jurisdiction over the province.  One system is sponsored by the 
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Daniel Deja, Enver Fezjullahu, Dara Katz, Francesca Marzatico, Lyubomir Pantovic, Knut Rosenhaug, 
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1. Most place names in this Article are given in both Serbian and Albanian, as is the common 
practice within the United Nations and other international organizations operating in Kosovo. However, 
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United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”), the 
other by the government of Serbia (“Serbia”).   The UNMIK courts are new 
creations, staffed mostly by Kosovo Albanians and a few members of the 
minority Serb population, but controlled primarily by the international 
UNMIK administration. 2  For the United Nations, these courts are the 
incarnation of its claim to have established rule of law under principles of 
non-discrimination and ethnic integration.  For Serbia, they are illegitimate 
occupiers’ courts, symbolizing the continued foreign domination of Serbian 
territory.   
The Serbian parallel courts3 are courts-in-exile, transplants of the official 
Kosovo courts that existed before the NATO bombing and the UNMIK 
administration.  To Serbia, they represent the original and legitimate courts of 
Kosovo and are an expression of Serbia’s continuing claim to sovereignty 
over the province.  To the United Nations, they are an obstacle to the 
resolution of Kosovo’s still uncertain political status, since its “Standards for 
Kosovo” require that “parallel structures have been dismantled” 4  when 
UNMIK yields administration to a permanent government.   
Kosovo’s parallel courts raise a classic question of post-conflict justice: 
How should a transitional government and its courts address the legacy of the 
past regime?5  “In the public imagination, transitional justice is commonly 
linked with punishment and the trials of ancien régimes,” 6  yet Kosovo’s 
parallel courts represent the under-recognized reality that this legacy is not 
just a matter of historical events, but rather, permeates the very structures of 
transitional societies, including the legal system itself.7  Shaped in settings of 
violence and repression, post-conflict legal systems like Kosovo’s maintain 
core features of these settings even after the conflict itself has formally ended.  
The very existence of the dual systems in Kosovo is a product of the Serbian-
Albanian conflict.  In their opposing claims to sole jurisdiction and their 
corresponding stance of mutual non-recognition, the parallel courts replicate, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
because it would be cumbersome to refer to “Kosovo/Kosova” throughout the Article in light of the 
frequency with which I use the term, I will refer solely to “Kosovo” throughout, as is also common 
practice in the U.N. and other organizations. This choice is purely a pragmatic one and is not intended to 
have political or other implications.  
2. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999); U.N. Mission in Kosovo, On 
the Appointment and Removal from Office of International Judges and International Prosecutors, U.N. 
Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/6 (Feb. 15, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/exam/ 
testdata/doc/5948d29e_06.pdf; U.N. Mission in Kosovo, On Assignment of International 
Judges/Prosecutors and/or Change of Venue, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/64 (Dec. 15, 2000), 
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg64-00.htm. 
3. Although these sets of courts are in a structural sense parallel to each other, and could thus 
technically both be called “parallel courts,” it is common practice in Kosovo to use this term only for the 
Serbian courts. The UNMIK courts, in contrast, are never referred to as such. Accordingly, in order to be 
as clear as possible about which courts I am referring to for readers within and without Kosovo, I refer 
throughout this Article to the “Serbian parallel courts” on the one hand, and to the “UNMIK courts” on 
the other. Like the other linguistic choices in this Article, this one is purely pragmatic and is not 
intended to have any political or other implications.  
4. Press Release, U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Standards for Kosovo, U.N. Doc. 
UNMIK/PR/1078 (Dec. 10, 2003), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2003/ 
pressr/pr1078.pdf. 
5. See generally RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2002). 
6. Id. at 27. 
7. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE xv (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 
2002). 
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and thus perpetuate, the divisions and disputes of the conflict that produced 
them, serving as a potential catalyst for ongoing divisions and violence.   
Indeed, the legacy of parallel courts in Kosovo hampers everyday 
decisions, as well as the pursuit of justice on a larger scale. For the people of 
Kosovo, these parallel systems create legal uncertainty and conflict on a basic, 
day-to-day level. Judgments from one system are not recognized by the other, 
nor do the two systems share court files, cadastral records of title to land, or 
records of births, deaths, marriages, or divorces.  To ensure enforcement of a 
divorce, a land sale, or a civil judgment, a Kosovo resident must pursue her 
claims in both systems.  This presents a confusing, costly, and complex 
proposition that gives rise to conflicting judgments and to speculation and 
arbitrage.  Because neither system recognizes the other’s judgments, criminal 
suspects may face trial in both sets of courts. There are accusations of ethnic 
bias in some cases concerning inter-ethnic violence and crime, and fears that 
inter-ethnic disputes over land ownership are being fueled by the maintenance 
of parallel and mutually exclusive sets of property records. 
For all concerned, the parallel systems stand for the larger political 
stalemate over Kosovo’s fate. Kosovo cannot claim to be self-governing while 
Serbia also purports to govern it. Nor can Serbia claim Kosovo as an integral 
part of the Serbian state so long as the Serbian government is effectively cut 
off from the basic institutions controlling the province.  Negotiations are 
currently ongoing to determine Kosovo’s final status, whether that will be 
autonomy, independence, or some other form of association with Serbia or 
another state.8 As it does so, the parallel courts issue is a synecdoche of the 
obstacles it faces: of the intractable political conflict over sovereignty that 
resists compromise, of the persistent ethnic divisions that defy integration, and 
of the stubborn gaps between ideal and reality within both judicial systems. 
While Kosovo’s parallel systems are an extreme example of a past 
regime’s legacy expressed as a full-fledged alternative court system, legal 
legacies of repressive norms, compromised courts, or ad hoc local tribunals 
are commonplace in transitional and post-conflict societies. Nonetheless, in 
recent years, the international community has focused its energies in another 
direction: to securing criminal justice in post-conflict societies for atrocities of 
the worst kind, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  
While this is a laudable goal, it is far from the only transitional justice concern 
these societies face.  Compensation for injuries and deaths, disputes over 
property rights, and the ad hoc and local measures that communities take to 
meet these needs when the state legal system is in flux: arguably these 
immediate concerns are as important to rebuilding post-conflict societies as 
high level criminal prosecutions of former political leaders.  But while 
criminal prosecutions have received the untiring efforts of some political 
institutions and non-governmental organizations, the international community 
                                                                                                                                                                         
8. Press Release, U.N. Office of the Special Envoy to Kosovo [UNOSEK], Pristina, 
Belgrade Delegations Meet in Vienna to Discuss the Future Status Process for Kosovo, U.N. Doc. 
UNOSEK/PR/2 (Feb. 21, 2006), available at http://www.unosek.org/pressrelease/ 
UNOSEK_PR%202_2006-02-21.pdf; News Coverage, UNMIK, Kosovo: UN Envoy Puts off Presenting 
Final Status Proposal till After Serb Poll in January (Nov. 10, 2006), available at  
http://www.unmikonline.org/news.htm#1011. 
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has not yet fully engaged itself in exploring ways of addressing these other 
transitional justice concerns.9  
Beyond the transitional justice context, Kosovo’s parallel courts are also 
an example of the legal pluralism that has developed in other divided 
societies.  Such a comprehensive parallel court system seems to be unique to 
Kosovo, but in many other states, communities have established their own 
judicial systems, claiming their own jurisdiction and following their own 
rules.  The underlying social and political tensions associated with plural 
systems and the legal questions concerning recognition and enforcement of 
judgments are common to these systems as well.  How, for example, should 
Mexico treat decisions from Zapatista courts?  What about the judgments of 
religious authorities in Iraq, Pakistan, Nigeria, or France?  How can long 
divided societies like the Greek and Turkish administrations in Cyprus 
incorporate each other’s judicial determinations if they are eventually unified?  
In analyzing the issues raised by the parallel courts in Kosovo, we may 
develop principles that are relevant for other states. 
These problems are not purely political, but also legal.  The fundamental 
underlying tension in Kosovo, as in other conflicted societies, is political—
here, competing claims to sovereignty over the province. Whether the Serbian 
parallel legal system should continue to exist is likewise a political decision 
that will be resolved eventually in the political realm, whether by negotiation 
and compromise or by force.  But the Serbian parallel system has issued legal 
decisions for seven years already and continues to do so.  As long as people in 
Kosovo continue to rely on those decisions, past or present, whether those 
judgments can and should be recognized and enforced are legal questions that 
must be addressed.   
These questions should be addressed separately from the ultimate 
political question of sovereignty as much as possible, on a purely legal level. 
Although there is a tendency to treat post-conflict and transitional legal 
settings as unique,10 in this situation, the ordinary systems for recognizing and 
enforcing foreign judgments and extra-judicial legal determinations offer 
seasoned approaches for grappling with the questions of legitimacy and 
fairness presented here. These systems were developed, after all, precisely in 
order to deal with contentious inter-state disputes in cases of overlapping 
claims to jurisdiction.11  Whether the Serbian parallel court judgments could 
be legally recognized, therefore, is a question that can be analyzed through 
comparative and conflict of laws approaches, looking to established 
procedures for recognition and enforcement of judgments. Here, although it 
may appear that there can be no mutual recognition while both systems claim 
exclusive jurisdiction over Kosovo, in fact, there are multiple models for 
recognition between overlapping systems.  Some of these models would not 
                                                                                                                                                                         
9. Bassiouni, supra note 7, at xv-xx (concluding, however, that it is appropriate to prioritize 
criminal justice); Anja Matwijkiw, A Philosophical Perspective on Rights, Accountability and Post-
Conflict Justice: Setting up the Problem, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 155. See generally 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). 
10. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary 
Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761 (2004).  
11. Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 5-9 (1988). 
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require the courts to recognize each other’s legitimacy as judicial institutions 
per se, nor to recognize the relevant political entities’ claims to exclusive 
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the territory.12 
This is not to suggest, of course, that the political and legal realms 
operate entirely separately from each other.  To the contrary, it is my 
contention that the existence of political interests in the results of legal 
processes is an entirely ordinary thing, particularly in the field of recognition 
of judgments.  Rather than posing a counter-argument against the use of legal 
processes to address the question of the parallel court judgments, the existence 
of political tensions presents exactly the sort of situation for which these legal 
processes were developed and designed. As such, these processes regularly 
tolerate the stress introduced by such political pressures.  The sense, rather, in 
which the political and legal are separate and should be treated separately is 
that the determination of the legal status of these decisions need not 
predetermine the ultimate political judgment on Kosovo’s sovereignty, nor 
does this ultimate political judgment need to take place in order for the status 
of the parallel judgments to be laid to rest. Likewise, should a decision on 
Kosovo’s sovereignty be reached before the parallel judgments have been 
addressed, that decision need not predetermine the recognition of those 
judgments either. While the political and the legal are always in some sense 
interrelated, the particular legal question of the status of parallel court 
judgments can be determined independently of the particular political question 
of Kosovo’s sovereignty. 
In considering whether and how to recognize the Serbian parallel courts’ 
judgments, Kosovo faces a tension between two competing goals:  promoting 
certainty in the finality and consistency of those judgments and ensuring their 
essential fairness.  To best promote legal certainty, Kosovo should establish 
mechanisms that maximize recognition of judgments, thereby eliminating the 
risks of conflicting judgments and of unenforced decisions.  However, if the 
Serbian parallel courts employ discriminatory procedures or issue arbitrary 
judgments, broader recognition of those judgments will merely lend them 
undeserved legitimacy.  There is, accordingly, a countervailing incentive to 
scrutinize Serbian parallel judgments before recognizing them, or not to 
recognize them at all. 
A balance between these two values—certainty and fairness—lies at the 
core of existing international and national legal frameworks for recognition 
and enforcement of judgments.  The trade-off between the two values is by no 
means absolute, but in general, establishing measures to protect one of these 
goals does tend to result in some cost to the other.  Subjecting judgments to 
increased levels of scrutiny to ensure their fairness inevitably introduces 
delays and unpredictability in their enforcement, in rough proportion to the 
complexity of the procedures and the stringency of the tests employed for that 
purpose.  The proper balance between these competing goals depends on an 
assessment of the likelihood that one or the other concern will arise, and of the 
impact that it is likely to have, both on individual litigants and on the society 
and judicial system as a whole.   
                                                                                                                                                                         
12. See discussion infra Part III. 
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In determining whether to adopt one of these models, Kosovo’s post-
conflict, transitional status provides the context in which those models must 
be weighed.  Likewise, the aims of transitional justice provide a normative 
imperative for applying the available models creatively and purposefully.  
While the content of transitional justice norms such as “rule of law” is hotly 
debated, as are the appropriate mechanisms for achieving such norms, there is 
no doubt that the aim of transitional justice is at heart transformative, seeking 
to “advance legitimacy in periods of political flux.”13  There is also by now 
general agreement that, particularly in post-conflict contexts, achieving any 
degree of this transformation through law requires accepting that this justice 
will inevitably be “imperfect and partial,” guided by “pragmatic principles.”14  
Indeed, Ruti Teitel has argued that the aims of transitional justice have 
evolved from “the ambitious goals of establishing rule of law and democracy” 
to the “concededly more modest” ones of “maintaining peace and stability.”15 
In Kosovo, the current approach of formal non-recognition, moderated 
by sporadic, unpredictable acknowledgment of judgments in particular cases 
for reasons of equity or compassion, creates legal uncertainties that inflict real 
harm upon the people of Kosovo and exacerbate the underlying political and 
social tensions.  Resolving the issue of recognition of judgments on purely 
legal, apolitical terms by following well established and generally recognized 
models would, in contrast, provide an immediate solution to the people who 
are relying on Serbian parallel judgments in their private lives. If 
accomplished before the negotiations on Kosovo’s political status are 
completed, it would also provide a foundation for political compromise on the 
broader questions of sovereignty.  In this context, even if a legal solution were 
to achieve nothing more than to take the issue of the parallel courts off the 
political bargaining table and out of the realm of social conflict, that would 
itself be a productive end. 
This Article undertakes an assessment of Kosovo’s parallel courts and of 
the existing legal models for recognition and enforcement of judgments, with 
the aim of proposing an appropriate framework for recognizing the judgments 
of the Serbian parallel courts.16 Part II describes the workings of the parallel 
                                                                                                                                                                         
13. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice in a New Era, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 893, 897 
(2003). Cf. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule of Law,” 
101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2322-23 (2003). 
14. Teitel, supra note 13, at 897. 
15. Id. at 898; see also Neil J. Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-
Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 55. 
16. Throughout this Article, I address the problem from the perspective of solutions UNMIK 
or a subsequent independent or autonomous Kosovo administration might adopt in order to provide at 
least some recognition of judgments. Although the problem of conflicting judgments affects Serbia and 
other states as well as Kosovo, it is relevant to those states only on a completely different scale and in a 
completely different context. For Kosovo, this is a core problem of transitional justice and the 
legitimacy of its judicial system. It is primarily within Kosovo that these judgments have their effect and 
it is UNMIK and the eventual post-U.N. Kosovo institutions that will have to determine how to 
reconcile these judgments. For Serbia and other states, in contrast, transitional justice norms are less 
relevant.  For these other states, the parallel court judgments are but one of the sets of judgments that the 
courts must choose whether to recognize and enforce. Nonetheless, at a general level my analysis may 
also be relevant for Serbian institutions determining how to treat UNMIK judgments, if modified to take 
account of the relevant Serbian law and Serbian interests in Kosovo. 
Also, this Article focuses solely on the parallel courts themselves and on the recognition of their 
judgments. All parallel administrative structures of other kinds, including security forces, education, and 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art39
2007] Parallel Courts 7 
 
systems, based in part on my own first-hand research in Kosovo, including 
interviews with Albanian and Serb judges and lawyers and with members of 
the international community working on the relevant legal issues.17 In Part III, 
I consider prominent legal models for recognizing decisions in civil disputes 
that have been reached outside of the state’s court system, and in Part IV, I 
review the more difficult concerns posed by criminal judgments and the more 
limited models available to address them.  
In my assessment, the proper balance between promoting legal certainty 
and ensuring fairness in Kosovo weighs more strongly in favor of promoting 
legal certainty in the civil context. In the criminal context, ensuring the 
fairness of the Serbian parallel judgments should be the preeminent concern. 
In addition, on the civil side, a robust set of models provide for generous 
recognition of civil judgments and present determinative factors that would 
allow Kosovo to mitigate the political and social costs associated with such 
recognition. In contrast, in the criminal realm, the models are few, the 
approaches to recognition relatively stingy, and the political and social 
problems associated with recognition in Kosovo are intractable and difficult to 
circumvent. Accordingly, I propose a civil judgments model that would allow 
for categorical recognition of most Serbian parallel civil decisions, while in 
the criminal context I reluctantly conclude that categorical recognition is not 
feasible and that the criminal judgments must instead be assessed on a case-
by-case basis.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
health care, are outside the scope of this article. The only areas of administration that I address are those 
that represent the recording and enforcement of court judgments, such as the cadastral records that 
reflect court judgments recognizing sale of property and the personal records that set down family law 
decrees on matters such as divorces and child custody. For a discussion of the full range of parallel 
structures, see DEP’T OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW, ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR. 
MISSION IN KOSOVO, PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN KOSOVO (2003) [hereinafter OSCE PARALLEL 
STRUCTURES REPORT]. 
17. A brief note on methodology: In addition to the legal and document-based research for 
this article, I conducted interviews with eleven people during a visit to Kosovo in May 2005, some of 
which serve as the basis for the description of the parallel courts’ current activities in Section II.D. I 
have identified most interviewees here by name, title, and workplace. However, all interviewees spoke 
in their personal capacities and not as representatives of their respective institutions. Some interviews 
were conducted directly in English, while others were conducted in Serbian or Albanian through 
translators. I selected my interviewees primarily on the basis of their experience with the UNMIK and 
Serbian parallel courts and with the related legal issues. They represent a number of different 
communities and legal institutions, including the relevant ethnic communities, lawyers, judges, and 
members of the international institutions operating in Kosovo. The number and selection of interviewees 
were limited in part by the unwillingness of many to speak about this topic because of its political 
sensitivity, while others would agree to discuss the matter only on an anonymous basis. Accordingly, 
these interviews are not intended to serve as a representative sample of the legal community in Kosovo, 
but rather are simply the reporting of knowledgeable individuals on their experience and observations. 
The interviewees do not endorse and are not responsible for the analysis or conclusions in this article; 
these are mine alone. Insofar as possible, I have cited multiple sources for the information obtained 
through these interviews and have cited anonymous sources only when the information was not 
available from another source.  
It is important to note that although such interviews are the subjective accounts of individual 
members of Kosovo’s legal community, this is nonetheless the most up-to-date information available 
about the Serbian parallel system. All the official reports on the subject are several years old and, 
significantly, rely on similar interviews for their information. Nonetheless, wherever possible I have 
confirmed the reports of my interviewees with references to the official reports. Throughout, citations to 
reports represent a historical record of the situation as of 2003 or earlier, while citations to interviews 
represent the views of some members of Kosovo’s legal community in 2005. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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From this analysis, there emerge some factors to be considered in 
developing models for recognition of judgments from outside the state-run 
court system, such as correspondence to existing legal models, convergences 
and divergences between the systems, and other concerns. The concluding 
section of the Article discusses these principles for other divided and 
transitioning states facing a problem of parallel courts. 
 
 
Map of Kosovo18 
                                                                                                                                                                         
18. United Nations Cartographic Section, Peacekeeping Map: UNMIK (Kosovo) (2004), 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/kosovo.pdf. Kosovo comprises an area of less than 
11,000 square kilometers, approximately one-third the size of Belgium. It has roughly two million 
residents, majority Albanian, with minority Serb, Roma, Turks, and other ethnicities. Most people live in 
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II. THE PARALLEL COURTS 
A. Political History 
The current situation in Kosovo had its birth in the province’s 
cataclysmic violence in 1998 and 1999, its gestation in the decade of 
discriminatory government that preceded it, and its inception some time long 
ago, preserved and obscured in contradictory historicized mythologies.19 The 
story of the courts in Kosovo is both representative of and shaped by the 
history of the region’s political system as a whole.  
Kosovo, together with the rest of the Balkans, has had the misfortune of 
being a contested territory on the border of competing empires for centuries. 
All this time, it has served as a strategic prize to be quarreled over, snatched, 
relinquished, and regained by powers its own peoples could not hope to 
control. Of importance for the current conflict, Kosovo was the site of a 
crucial defeat of the Serbs by the Ottomans in 1389, initiating 500 years of 
Ottoman rule and crystallizing Kosovo’s place as hallowed ground in Serbian 
nationalist ideology.20 The modern struggle for Kosovo began in 1912, when 
after some years of Albanian revolt against waning Ottoman control, the 
Serbian army conquered Kosovo. During World War I it was occupied by the 
Austrians, and in 1918, when the victorious powers divided the majority 
Albanian region of the Balkans between the new states of Yugoslavia and 
Albania, Kosovo went to Yugoslavia.21 Armed and political struggles over 
whether the province should be part of the new federation, part of Albania, or 
independent, ensued for a number of years.22  
During the Cold War, under Tito’s rule, Kosovo’s political fate shifted. 
It gradually acquired increasing powers of self-government within 
Yugoslavia, with the most significant step being its acquisition of the status of 
an autonomous province and self-government under the 1974 Yugoslav 
constitution. Within the Yugoslavian legal system, Kosovo’s system 
overlapped with the federal one, sharing, for example, its criminal procedure 
code but operating under its own civil and criminal codes. Some Kosovo 
Albanians began seeking status as a republic in the 1980s, which would have 
                                                                                                                                                                         
rural areas.  The majority Albanian population occupies most of Kosovo, while the minority Serb 
population inhabits the northern portion of the province ranging from north of the Ibar river that runs 
through Mitrovicё/Mitrovica up to the border with Serbia, as well as a number of discrete enclave 
communities in other parts of the state. Although UNMIK documents typically provide place names 
both in Serbian and in Albanian, this U.N. map provides place names only in Serbian. Also, note that 
this map pre-dates Montenegro’s independence. 
19. This succinct description of Kosovo’s history is not intended to be comprehensive nor to 
take any position on Serbian or Albanian historical, political, or cultural claims to Kosovo. Rather, it is 
meant only to present some necessary background for the legal analysis that follows. Of necessity in 
such a brief account, this discussion does not touch on many aspects of Kosovo’s history, ancient and 
modern.  For fuller histories of Kosovo and of the genesis of the current situation, see generally MISHA 
GLENNY, THE BALKANS: NATIONALISM, WAR AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1804-1999 (1999); ROBERT D. 
KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH HISTORY (2005 ed.); NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO: A 
SHORT HISTORY (1999); and TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE  (2000). 
20. KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 35-39; MALCOLM, supra note 19, at 62-63. 
21. GLENNY, supra note 19, at 416; KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 44-45; MALCOLM, supra note 
19, at 264-65. 
22. GLENNY, supra note 19, at 416; KAPLAN, supra note 19, at 44-45; MALCOLM, supra note 
19, at 272-78. 
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meant formally “detaching it from Serbia and conceding that it had the right to 
secede.”23 Throughout this period, Serbs left Kosovo in large numbers, and 
rumors of Albanian violence against Serbs were rife.24  
Kosovo’s position, and the position of its inhabitants, changed 
dramatically after Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power on a groundswell of 
Serbian nationalism between 1987 and 1989. After Milosevic gained power, 
he swiftly moved to revoke Kosovo’s autonomous status. 25  Although the 
numbers of Albanians and Serbs did not change, what had been the Albanian 
majority in Kosovo became an Albanian minority in Serbia at large. Serbia 
then instituted what has been described as an “apartheid” regime limiting 
Albanian status and participation in public life.26 It banned the use of the 
Albanian language in courts, schools and other areas of public life and fired 
most Albanians from their positions in the government, including the judicial 
system. In response, many Albanians boycotted what remained of the place 
allowed them in the formal government and in society, for example, by 
educating their children in makeshift private schools.27   
In addition, the Albanians were the first to establish a parallel 
government in Kosovo. Kosovo nationalists declared independence in 1990, 
following the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomous status,28 and throughout 
this period, many Albanians refused to participate in Serbian elections, instead 
electing their own shadow parliament. However, this system did not include 
parallel courts.29   
As Yugoslavia imploded, Kosovo remained outside the fray until 1996, 
when the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”) launched its first armed attack. 
The violence between Serbian police and the KLA escalated, culminating in 
the NATO bombing campaign and the Serbian offensive of 1999. After 
NATO began bombing Serbian forces in the region in an effort to force their 
retreat from Kosovo, those forces instead swept through the province, pushing 
the Albanian population into Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania.30   
B. Source of the Parallel Courts 
When NATO air strikes eventually forced the Serbian military across the 
border into Serbia proper, much of the Serb population went with it. This was 
the population that had governed the province for the previous ten years, and 
as they left, they took with them the symbols, tools, and institutions of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
23. GLENNY, supra note 19, at 624. 
24. See id. at 624-25. 
25. Id. at 653. 
26. Ian Fisher, Combative Milosevic Displays a Flair for Courtroom Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 20, 2002, at A4. 
27. GLENNY, supra note 19, at 653; JUDAH, supra note 19, at 61-73. 
28. GLENNY, supra note 19, at 653. 
29. Interview with Adem Vokshi, Chairman of the Kosova Chamber of Advocates, in 
Mitrovicё/Mitrovica (May 27, 2005) [hereinafter Vokshi Interview] (speaking in his personal capacity). 
Like the others interviewed for this article, Mr. Vokshi’s contribution of factual information does not 
imply any endorsement of the author’s analysis or conclusions. For a brief note on the methodology of 
these interviews, see supra note 17. See also JUDAH, supra note 19, at 70-73 (describing parallel 
government, education, and health systems but not courts). 
30. GLENNY, supra note 19, at 654-58. 
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governance, stripping the university and other public buildings bare. From the 
courts, this meant not only the official court seals and stamps, but also many 
of the judges, attorneys, and other personnel. Indeed, it was not just the courts 
themselves that were removed, but the whole administrative structure, 
including the property cadastral records and also the records of births, 
marriages, divorces, and deaths. There were already copies of these records in 
Belgrade, but the departing Serbs also took some of the original records from 
Kosovo, so that in some instances there is now a copy in Belgrade and an 
original with the Serbian parallel court or administrative office, while the 
UNMIK courts do not have a copy at all. Of course, in some instances records 
were lost or destroyed in the mayhem.31  
In effect, the courts of Kosovo picked up and moved wholesale to 
Serbia. There, the Serbian government reinstituted them, reasserting its 
jurisdiction over its prior territories. The municipal and district courts of the 
Kosovo city of Priština/Prishtinё32 were moved to the city of Nis in Serbia 
proper, those of Mitrovicё/Mitrovica to the Serbian city of Kraljevo, and so 
on. Accordingly, when the U.N. began its administration of Kosovo in 1999, 
the province lacked an internally operating judicial system. Eventually, as the 
Serb enclaves were established within Kosovo, some of the Serbian parallel 
municipal courts and the associated cadastres set themselves up there, but the 
district courts remained in Serbia proper, safely across the border from 
UNMIK jurisdiction and NATO’s Kosovo Force (“KFOR”) troops.33   
Thus, what are now the Serbian parallel courts were in fact the formal 
courts of Kosovo, before the Security Council established the UNMIK civil 
administration in Kosovo through Resolution 1244. Accordingly, the Serbian 
parallel and UNMIK courts’ competing claims to legitimacy are ultimately 
grounded in the conflicting political claims to sovereignty over the province. 
The Serbs did not create a new judicial system, but rather, reconstructed their 
prior one and did not concede that they had lost jurisdiction, defrocked by the 
combined force of NATO’s military might and the UN’s political power. For 
its part, the U.N. has created for Kosovo both new courts and new laws, 
backed by the moral authority of responding to humanitarian need and by an 
uncertain relationship to international law.34 
                                                                                                                                                                         
31. Interview with Kaplan Baruti, President of the District Court of Mitrovicё/Mitrovica and 
President of the Association of Judges, in Mitrovicё/Mitrovica (May 24, 2005) (speaking solely in his 
personal capacity and not as a representative of the Court or the Association) [hereinafter Baruti 
Interview]; Interview with Knut Rosandhaug, Executive Director, Housing and Property Directorate, 
Housing and Property Claims Commission, in Priština/Prishtinё (May 27, 2005) (speaking solely in his 
personal capacity and not as a representative of the Directorate) [hereinafter Rosandhaug Interview]; 
Interview with Lyubomir Pantovic, defense attorney, in Mitrovicё/Mitrovica (May 27, 2005) (speaking 
solely in his personal capacity) [hereinafter Pantovic Interview]. 
32. For an explanation of my treatment of place names throughout this Article, please see 
supra note 1. 
33. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 17-19. 
34. NATO’s justification for its use of force in Kosovo was humanitarian intervention, which 
has not traditionally been considered an adequate justification for the use of force under international 
law. This incident, along with cases of non-intervention such as Rwanda’s genocide, has since become 
the catalyst for arguments in favor of recognizing an exception authorizing use of force for humanitarian 
purposes. E.g., Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental 
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS (J.L. Holzgrefe 
& Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003). The U.N.’s governance of Kosovo is also on uncertain legal ground, 
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C. Development of the Parallel Systems 
Of course, the Serbian parallel courts have not continued to operate just 
as they did before 1999. They do claim the same competencies and 
jurisdiction, apply Serbian law, approve documents with the same stamps and 
insignia, and use the same names and titles. But they have changed in 
response to the transformation in their political status and in the socio-political 
reality that surrounds them.   
In the early months of UNMIK’s administration, the Serbian parallel 
courts were the only courts operating on behalf of Kosovo, whether located 
within the province itself or in Serbia proper. Even as UNMIK began to 
promulgate laws for Kosovo, the Serbian parallel courts continued to apply 
the law of Serbia, pronouncing judgment under the ostensible authority of the 
Serbian government. At this time, the Serbian parallel courts carried out the 
full range of competencies that they had before UNMIK: criminal and civil 
cases, including on the civil side all manner of litigation, family matters such 
as marriages and divorces, and affirmation of contracts including, 
significantly, contracts for the sale of real property. Although Albanians and 
Serbs had separated themselves into two societies, both Albanians and Serbs 
had only the Serbian parallel structures to turn to in order to resolve their legal 
problems.35   
For the last seven years, the Serbian parallel courts and the other Serbian 
parallel administrative offices serving judicial, adjudicative, and record-
keeping functions have continued to operate. The Serbian parallel judicial 
system is divided between one set of courts ensconced within the Serb 
enclaves in Kosovo itself, and another set operating within Serbia on behalf of 
their assigned regions in Kosovo. Only municipal courts (the lowest level, 
first instance courts) operate within the enclaves in Kosovo itself, and it is said 
that some of these courts act as a referral service for the courts in Serbia as 
                                                                                                                                                                         
although it does not directly contravene established international law as NATO’s campaign did. Kosovo 
was the first instance in which the Security Council relied on Chapter VII as a basis for establishing 
U.N. administration over a territory. In the political and legal vacuum caused by Serbia’s withdrawal 
from the province, some form of transitional administration was likely both necessary and directly 
related to the Security Council’s Chapter VII authority to address threats to international peace and 
security. There is, however, a reasonable argument that the extent and duration of the civil 
administration in Kosovo extends beyond the scope of that authority. Michael J. Matheson, United 
Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 76-78, 83-85 (2001) (arguing that 
this type of administration is within the Security Council’s authority but acknowledging that it is not a 
settled question and considering the counter-arguments).  
35. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 5. Of Kosovo’s other, smaller 
minorities, most tend to live either in their own discrete communities or in the Serbian enclaves, 
although the Turk minority is reportedly well-integrated into Kosovo Albanian society. These minorities 
do not exert much political influence and do not operate under their own legal system, instead making 
use of both the Serbian parallel and UNMIK systems. ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., TENTH 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN KOSOVO 31-33 (2003) [hereinafter OSCE 
TENTH MINORITY ASSESSMENT]; Interview with Alice Thomas and Francesca Marzatico, International 
Legal Advisors, Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo in Priština/Prishtinё (May 25, 2005) (speaking 
solely in their personal capacities and not as representatives of the Ombudsperson) [hereinafter Thomas 
& Marzatico Interview]. 
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much as proper courts in their own right. In Serbia proper, both municipal 
courts and district courts (the second tier court) hear cases and appeals.36   
Meanwhile, the province of Kosovo has been administered for the last 
seven years by UNMIK as a protectorate under U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1244.37 From the complete shambles of 1999, Kosovo’s judicial 
system has been recreated, reorganized, and restaffed, mostly with Kosovo 
Albanians, but also with some Serbs, and, strategically, with international 
judges and prosecutors in the Supreme Court and in other key positions. There 
are now UNMIK courts established for every district of Kosovo.38 UNMIK 
has been facilitating the development of Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government, with the intention of eventually turning over all governance in 
Kosovo to these institutions, including the judiciary. In 2006, Kosovo began 
international negotiations over its final status, and since then, UNMIK has 
turned over control of certain institutions, such as the Ombudsman’s office, to 
local authorities.39 While a December 2005 UNMIK regulation established a 
Ministry of Justice as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, 
at this time, that Ministry was still “preparing to gradually take over the 
majority of the justice-related reserved powers” 40  held by UNMIK, and 
UNMIK still issues regulations, controls appointment of judges, and 
administers the courts directly in most respects.41  
The relationship between the UNMIK courts and the Serbian courts has 
been one of a shifting balance of power. Initially, UNMIK courts were 
unknown to the population, and the Serbian parallel courts represented the 
familiar, established judiciary. At times, the Serbian parallel courts and 
UNMIK courts within Kosovo have operated side by side, causing no 
inconsiderable confusion for parties who arrived at the courthouse to find 
themselves confronted by two sets of courts. In the Serb enclave of Zubin 
Potok, for example, the Serbian parallel court for some time had its office on 
the same floor of the same building as the UNMIK court and was marked by a 
sign reading simply: “Certification of Contracts, Authorisations; Tuesday and 
Friday 9-11 AM; Municipal Court of Mitrovica Sub-Office Zubin Potok.”42 
Over time, as UNMIK courts have been established within many of the 
enclaves, the actual activities of the Serbian parallel courts located within 
                                                                                                                                                                         
36. Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, 
supra note 29; Interview with Daniel Deja, Chief of Party, and Enver Fejzullahu, Senior Staff Associate, 
Justice System Reform Activity in Kosovo, in Priština/Prishtinё (May 25, 2005) (speaking in their 
personal capacities) [hereinafter Deja & Fejzullahu Interview]; U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES & 
ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR., NINTH ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES 
IN KOSOVO, para. 30 (May 31, 2002), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/reports/ 
MinorityAssessmentReport9ENG.pdf [hereinafter OSCE NINTH MINORITY ASSESSMENT]. 
37. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 2. 
38. EUR. PARL. ASS., Res. 1417, art. 5(ii) (2005). 
39. OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, at 4 (July 
11, 2006) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT]. 
40. Id. at 19. 
41. Id. at 18-19; U.N. Mission in Kosovo Home Page, http://www.unmik.org (last visited Dec. 
2, 2006). The respective roles and authorities of UNMIK and the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government concerning the judiciary are not well-defined. See, e.g., U.N. Mission in Kosovo, 
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, art. 9.4, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 
(May 15, 2001) [hereinafter Constitutional Framework]. 
42. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 17-18. 
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those areas have diminished correspondingly.43 However, the UNMIK courts 
are still inactive within some enclaves, leaving the Serbian parallel courts to 
fill the void. Throughout Kosovo and in Serbia proper, the Serbian parallel 
courts continue to operate today.44    
D. The Parallel Systems’ Current Role 
 The Serbian parallel courts no longer play the all-encompassing role 
that they did in the first days and months of UNMIK’s administration. Over 
the past seven years, the UNMIK courts have taken over many of the ordinary 
legal functions of the province. Nevertheless, the Serbian parallel system 
continues to fill crucial gaps in the functioning of the UNMIK administration, 
especially for the Serb minority, but for the rest of the population as well.   
Insofar as the recognition of Serbian parallel court judgments is 
concerned, what is most important is that their judgments from the past seven 
years represent a legal edifice of contracts, marriages, criminal convictions, 
and other decisions that Kosovo cannot readily discard. The most recent report 
on the Serbian parallel system indicates that it heard roughly 8000 cases and 
claims between June 1999 (at the end of the NATO bombing) and January 
2003, and that it had approximately 780 cases pending as of January 2003, of 
which 700 had been filed during the UNMIK administration. These cases ran 
the gamut of subjects, including both civil and criminal matters.45  
Both Kosovo and Serbia have civil law, code-based systems. 
Accordingly, the existence of parallel legal systems does not present a 
problem of conflicting lines of precedent, as it would in a common law 
system, because the results in each case are binding only on the parties. 
Indeed, in each case the judge applies the relevant provisions of the applicable 
legal code directly to the case in question, without consideration of prior case 
law.  Of course, these are not the same codes: The Serbian parallel courts 
apply the law of Serbia, while the UNMIK courts apply a combination of old 
and new laws, with some pre-dating the dissolution of Yugoslavia and others 
implemented after the beginning of UNMIK administration.   
1. In Civil Cases 
In civil matters, the Serb community currently uses the Serbian parallel 
structures far more than the Albanian population, which tends to rely on the 
UNMIK system as much as possible. However, all Kosovo residents, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
43. For example, the internal Serbian parallel courts no longer operate in the formal court 
buildings, but are relegated to private offices and, it is said, even in some instances to private homes. 
Pantovic Interview, supra note 31. 
44. OSCE TENTH MINORITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 34, at 33; Vokshi Interview, supra note 
29; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Deja & Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36. 
45. As of May 2002, Serbian parallel courts were still hearing cases for the entire territory of 
Kosovo, with thirty-four judges working in a variety of municipal courts within the enclaves in Kosovo 
and some number of municipal and district courts operating within Serbia proper. OSCE PARALLEL 
STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 17-21. In May 2005, those I interviewed opined that, from what 
they had observed, the Serbian parallel courts within Kosovo had a reduced caseload and a narrower 
range of competencies than in the past. Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; Pantovic Interview, supra note 
31; Deja & Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36. 
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regardless of ethnicity, have to use the Serbian parallel system for certain 
crucial matters in which UNMIK has not attained competency or received 
international recognition. Furthermore, the UNMIK system suffers from a 
confusing patchwork of new and old laws and from the absence of pre-1999 
records, hampering its effectiveness and inducing Albanians as well as Serbs 
to turn to the Serbian parallel system for some concerns. 
Many Serbs have continued to use the Serbian parallel system for 
matters that are internal to the Serb community, such as contracts, marriages, 
and litigation in which both parties are Serb.46 However, this reliance is not 
necessarily a political statement. Many Serbs do not feel comfortable traveling 
outside their enclaves because of security concerns, and while there are 
UNMIK courts for every district in the province, UNMIK has established 
courts in only some of the enclaves within those districts.47 It has proven 
difficult for UNMIK to attract Serb prosecutors and judges, due both to 
security problems and to social pressure, and this has both slowed the process 
of establishing courts in Serb-dominated areas and contributed to the problem 
of Serbian mistrust of Albanian-dominated institutions. 48  There are also 
simple but substantial pragmatic and convenience costs associated with going 
to the often unfamiliar and distant UNMIK courts. 49  In areas where the 
UNMIK courts have come to be viewed as effective, they have reportedly 
received increasing numbers of Serbian cases.50 However, while the problems 
of violence, social pressure, and mistrust of the UNMIK courts’ fairness and 
effectiveness were most acute in the early years of UNMIK administration, 
they continue today.51  
In contrast, the Albanian population, generally averse to the indicia and 
institutions of the prior regime, has shifted its civil claims gradually to the 
UNMIK courts, to the extent that the courts have proved themselves capable 
of handling claims and cases. In addition, just as Serbs are reluctant to travel 
into Albanian dominated areas, so many Albanians hesitate to travel into the 
Serb enclaves, for similar reasons of security and inconvenience. As a result 
                                                                                                                                                                         
46. Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31. Eighty percent of 
Serbs surveyed in 2005 indicated that they followed Serbian law rather than Kosovo law. INT’L FED’N 
FOR ELECTION SYS. & U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., MEASURING AND IMPROVING CITIZENS’ 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY IN KOSOVO 2005, at 21 (2005), 
available at http://www.ifes.org/publication/8471b8e4a755a9e35938d86f563a81e8/kosovo_survey.pdf 
[hereinafter 2005 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY]. 
47. OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 2003-2004, at 12, 18-
19 (July 1, 2004) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT]. 
48. For example, in 1999, UNMIK hired two Serb judges and two Serb prosecutors to work at 
the court in North Mitrovica, a Serbian area, along with four Albanian judges and some Albanian 
prosecutors. Within a month, all the Serbs had quit, reportedly due to pressure and threats from members 
of the Serbian community not to cooperate with UNMIK. Since then, UNMIK has succeeded in hiring 
two Serb judges for the Mitrovica court. Baruti Interview, supra note 31. 
49. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 22; Baruti Interview, supra note 
31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi 
Interview, supra note 29. 
50. Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, 
supra note 29. 
51. For example, in a 2005 public opinion survey, only 18% of Serbs surveyed indicated 
confidence in the UNMIK courts.  Seventy-nine percent of Serbs surveyed expressed the view that there 
was bias and inequality in the system. 2005 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, supra note 46, at 14.  
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of these disincentives, most Albanians use the Serbian parallel courts only for 
those matters which the UNMIK courts are not competent to handle.52 
There are still several crippling limitations to the effectiveness of the 
UNMIK courts that push Kosovo residents of all ethnicities to make use 
instead of the Serbian parallel courts and administrative structures. On the one 
hand, presently the UNMIK courts and administration are functioning within 
Kosovo itself, so that Kosovo residents of whatever ethnicity can accomplish 
virtually any legal or bureaucratic task for purposes of enforcement within 
Kosovo through those courts, whether it be seeking a civil judgment, pursuing 
a divorce, participating in a criminal trial, or getting an UNMIK travel 
document or license plates.53  
However, these judgments and documents are not necessarily effective 
outside Kosovo. They are not recognized by Serbia, nor by a number of other 
neighboring states. In order to enforce a civil judgment against a Serb 
defendant; in order to travel on a Serbian passport that is good for ten years 
and recognized by all states, instead of an UNMIK travel document that is 
good for two years and recognized by only some states; in order to drive one’s 
car legally in some neighboring states; in order to have one’s divorce, 
property sale, or inheritance recognized in Serbia; and in order to have one’s 
criminal conviction or acquittal recognized as final in Serbia, Kosovo 
residents, whether Albanian or Serb, must pursue their interests through the 
Serbian parallel system.54 
But of course, UNMIK does not recognize Serbian parallel court and 
administration judgments either, so to have one’s judgment, license plate, 
divorce, and so on recognized by the UNMIK administration that currently 
controls Kosovo (and by the KFOR and police forces that enforce the law 
there), all residents of Kosovo, whether Albanian or Serbian, must pursue 
their interests through the UNMIK system.55 Accordingly, the only way to 
have one’s legal document or judgment recognized everywhere is to pursue it 
through both systems independently. 
Another limitation on UNMIK effectiveness is that UNMIK does not 
have many of the pre-1999 Kosovo records. Some were taken to Serbia, some 
were destroyed, and some are still in the possession of the Serbian parallel 
                                                                                                                                                                         
52. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 18-19; Baruti Interview, supra 
note 31; Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29. In contrast to 
Serbian views, see supra note 46, 98% of Albanians report following Kosovo law. 2005 PUBLIC OPINION 
SURVEY, supra note 46, at 21.  In addition, the majority of Albanians indicate “at least a fair amount of 
confidence in the legal system’s [i.e. the UNMIK courts’] ability to maintain law and order and protect 
rights,” and only 11% of Albanians indicated any level of disagreement with the statement that “the 
judicial system in Kosovo is unbiased and treats all persons equally.” Id., at 14, 21. 
53. Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29.  
54. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 6; Thomas & Marzatico 
Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29. 
55. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 5; OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 53-54; OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 
11; Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29. Note that non-
recognition is not identical with non-toleration. While UNMIK has not recognized parallel courts or 
other parallel structures as legitimate, it has tolerated their existence and activities at varying levels at 
varying times, in the sense of not acting to eliminate them or prevent their activity. Cf. DANIEL SERWER 
& YLL BAJRAKTARI, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, KOSOVO: ETHNIC NATIONALISM AT ITS 
TERRITORIAL WORST (2006), available at https://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr172.pdf. 
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courts in the enclaves. Regardless, if a matter requires confirmation of a legal 
document from before 1999, such as the criminal record statement required to 
obtain a visa, one must go through the Serbian parallel system to acquire that 
document.56 The UNMIK courts can request documents from Serbia by an 
indirect route through the UNMIK administration, but this process is far more 
cumbersome than direct resort to the Serbian parallel system, and Serbia has 
ignored UNMIK requests in some cases.57 
Furthermore, under UNMIK’s rule, the law in force in Kosovo now is a 
hodgepodge of different sources: regulations issued by the Special 
Representative to the Secretary General (the “SRSG”) trump, followed by the 
pre-1989 law of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the extent that 
it is not discriminatory, codes drafted and approved by the provisional 
legislature and the SRSG, and international law.58 This mélange of sources of 
law, together with UNMIK’s failure to adequately distribute and translate its 
new regulations, have created substantial uncertainty as to what the law is on 
any given subject.59   
Finally, the UNMIK courts have suffered from the understandable 
problems of a new court system: a backlog of cases, lack of staffing on every 
level, an inexperienced judiciary and bar in need of training, lack of 
compliance with judgments, and so on. This has resulted in lengthy delays in 
proceedings, accusations of partiality, and an inability to execute judgments. 
There are also charges of widespread corruption, resulting at least in part from 
inadequate salaries. Although the UNMIK system is fully effective in 
principle, in practice there remain vital lags in its operation, and the Serbian 
parallel courts are in many instances operating as a stopgap.60  
Generalizing broadly, the net result is that Albanians tend to use the 
UNMIK system for most civil matters, except when they need recognition 
from Serbia or another UNMIK-unfriendly government, or when the UNMIK 
system flounders, and then they turn to the Serbian parallel system. Serbs by 
and large use the UNMIK system for anything involving interaction with 
UNMIK or the broader Albanian community, but frequently use the Serbian 
                                                                                                                                                                         
56. This reality has given rise to a new cottage industry. Because some Albanians are not 
comfortable traveling to Serbia or to the enclaves to visit the Serbian parallel courts/administration, 
there are Serbs who, for a fee, will travel to the requisite court or office to acquire or file the necessary 
document. Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; see also OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra 
note 16, at 22. 
57. OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 53-54; OSCE PARALLEL 
STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 21; Baruti Interview, supra note 31. 
58. U.N. Mission in Kosovo, On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. 
UNMIK/REG/2000/59 (Oct. 27, 2000).  
59. In a 2005 public opinion survey, 77% of Kosovo residents surveyed said they “did not 
know how to obtain information about the law” in Kosovo, and 80% “did not know that UNMIK 
publicly announces any new regulations.” 2005 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, supra note 46, at 9-10. See 
also OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 12-14. For an assessment of UNMIK’s 
legal system, see GJYLBEHARE MURATI, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY AND ITS ROLE IN THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER UN ADMINISTRATION USING THE CASE OF KOSOVO 6-9, 
available at http://www.esil-sedi.org/english/pdf/Murati.PDF; OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL 
REPORT, supra note 47, at 8-9. 
60. OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 12-23; OMBUDSPERSON 
FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 8-14. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
18 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  [Vol. 32: 1 
 
parallel system for civil matters internal to the Serb community or likewise for 
any civil question requiring Serbian authentication for outside recognition.61   
Although the overall pattern of civil cases in the Serbian parallel system 
has been one of a decreasing caseload and narrowing role, the thousands of 
Serbian parallel civil judgments over the last seven years underpin many of 
the economic and social arrangements of Kosovo society. Even if the Serbian 
parallel system were to disappear entirely today, that legacy would remain, 
and it must somehow be absorbed into Kosovo’s official legal system. 
2. In Criminal Cases 
Criminal prosecutions in the Serbian parallel courts operate according to 
a different dynamic than the civil cases. Rather than being instigated by 
litigants’ choice of the Serbian parallel court venue like the civil cases, they 
are an exercise of police authority by the Serbian state. As such, they pose a 
direct challenge to UNMIK’s control over Kosovo’s always precarious 
stability and security. While UNMIK has generally ignored the Serbian 
parallel courts’ civil judgments, it has taken steps to eliminate, so far as 
possible, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Serbian parallel courts. In 
2003, KFOR ordered the Serbian parallel courts in the enclaves to stop 
handling criminal cases. 62  Since then, it appears that the Serbian parallel 
courts within Kosovo have stopped hearing criminal cases, at least for the 
most part, and perhaps entirely.63 
The Serbian parallel district courts in Serbia, however, have reportedly 
continued to hear criminal cases, asserting jurisdiction over defendants who 
have crossed into Serbia proper and are arrested there, as well as holding trials 
in absentia in a few instances.64 Particularly in cases involving inter-ethnic 
crimes and war crimes, these trials have severe social ramifications, especially 
because the defendants in the Serbian parallel courts are virtually always 
                                                                                                                                                                         
61. Overall, the Serbian parallel courts in the enclaves now reportedly deal primarily with 
family matters and civil and commercial lawsuits against businesses that are based in Serbia and do 
some business in Kosovo or otherwise involve the Serb community. While there are Serbian parallel 
property cadastres, it is said that property sales are more typically registered with the UNMIK 
authorities now than with the Serbian parallel system. The Serbian parallel administrative offices also 
facilitate travel documents, license plates, and keep records of court decisions and property and personal 
transactions certified by the courts. Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note 
29; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31. 
62. Interview with Michael Scheutz, Chief, Rule of Law Section, Department of Human 
Rights and Rule of Law, Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur., in Priština/Prishtinё (May 27, 2005) 
(speaking solely in his personal capacity and not as a representative of the OSCE). Notably, although the 
Serbian parallel court judges interviewed for the 2003 OSCE report contended that the number of 
criminal cases in the Serbian parallel system was diminishing, the majority of pending cases filed after 
1999 were criminal: 527 out of 702. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 19-21. 
63. While most individuals I interviewed asserted that the Serbian parallel courts within 
Kosovo had entirely stopped hearing criminal cases, there was one report that at least some criminal 
cases continue. Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, 
supra note 29; Deja & Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36. 
64. While most interviewees agreed that the Serbian parallel courts located in Serbia continue 
to hear criminal cases, there was one report that they have also stopped hearing criminal cases. Baruti 
Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; Deja & 
Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36. 
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Serb.65 Inter-ethnic cases are not likely to be great in number, in light of the 
division between Kosovo Albanian and Serb communities. However, when 
instances of inter-ethnic violence do occur, they can set off a volatile 
response, as evidenced by the rioting and attacks on the Serb community 
instigated by media-driven rumors of Serbian involvement in the drowning 
deaths of three Albanian children in March 2004. 66  In an atmosphere of 
heightened inter-ethnic tension, each such case has a disproportionate impact, 
undermining Serbs’ confidence in UNMIK’s ability to ensure their personal 
security and in its ability to provide justice for invasions of that security.67 
The parallel criminal systems create risks for defendants as well, as 
criminal defendants tried in one system do not thereby find themselves 
protected against a second prosecution in the other.68 As in the civil cases, 
even if the Serbian parallel courts were to stop hearing all criminal cases now, 
the legacy of past criminal judgments would somehow need to be addressed 
by the UNMIK system, which would need to determine whether to re-try 
defendants within its jurisdiction whose cases have already been heard in the 
Serbian parallel courts. However, in doing so, it would face the challenges 
discussed in the Subsection on civil cases above, as well as others particular to 
the criminal context. The Kosovo Ombudsperson reports that the effectiveness 
of the UNMIK courts in criminal cases is limited by systemic lack of 
cooperation from victims and witnesses as a result of law enforcement’s 
failure to protect them, by inadequate jail space for those convicted and 
sentenced to prison time, as well as by problems of corruption within the 
judicial system.69 
3. Political Significance 
Of course, it is not only possible but ordinary for multiple judicial 
systems to co-exist in the same territory, as occurs, for example, in some 
federal systems. However, this requires agreement regarding jurisdiction and 
recognition of judgments, as well as some degree of comity, none of which is 
present here. To the contrary, not only has there been no consensus on these 
issues, but the two systems are explicitly founded on non-recognition and 
represent competing claims to sovereignty over Kosovo. 
The political strategizing that surrounds the parallel courts is one 
indication of their political significance. As one example, in order to maintain 
its foothold in the province, the Serbian government has been paying 
substantially higher salaries to the judicial officers working in the Serbian 
parallel courts within Kosovo than to those working in the ordinary court 
                                                                                                                                                                         
65. Few Albanians are comfortable crossing the border into Serbia proper, due to continuing 
security concerns, so that de facto most defendants who are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts in 
Serbia proper are Serbs. Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29. 
66. OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 19-20; Kosovo Reflects on 
Riots of One Year Ago (Voice of America broadcast Mar. 16, 2005), transcript available at 2005 WLNR 
4085156; Neil Barnett, Albanians Posed as Serbs to Stoke Ethnic Fires in Kosovo, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH 
(London), Mar. 28, 2004, at 26. 
67. OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 10-11. 
68. See discussion infra Part IV. 
69. OMBUSDPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 22-23. 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
20 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  [Vol. 32: 1 
 
system in Serbia, thereby inducing them to remain at their posts.70 For its part, 
while UNMIK has tended to ignore the Serbian parallel court system by and 
large, it has tried to persuade Serb judges and lawyers to transfer to the 
UNMIK system. To this end, it has held certain positions open for Serb 
candidates, for example, and established courts and offices within the Serb 
enclaves.71  
It is also important to recognize that while the functioning of these two 
systems side by side has created problems for both Serbia and UNMIK, it has 
offered some benefits to both sides as well. For Belgrade, it has served as an 
expression of a continuing claim to administration in Kosovo that is symbolic 
and practical, but not so obtrusive a challenge to UNMIK authority as to spur 
a confrontation. It serves also as a continuing commitment to the Serbs in 
Kosovo that they will not be abandoned by the state. For although the Serbian 
parallel courts claim jurisdiction over all of Kosovo, in fact they function like 
courts everywhere and take only those cases that come to them, and those who 
bring the cases are generally, although not exclusively, Serb.72   
For UNMIK, these courts and other aspects of the Serbian parallel 
administration have long filled a gap in UNMIK capabilities by serving the 
needs of a discrete, often hostile population that also poses the logistical 
problem of an additional working language.73 For a long time, UNMIK had its 
hands full attempting to administer the province for the relatively cooperative 
Kosovo Albanian population, and only recently has it been in a position to 
consider fully extending its reach to the Serb population.74 While UNMIK has 
been making efforts to integrate Serbs into its administration, to some extent 
the existence of this Serbian parallel administration has been a benefit to 
UNMIK by providing some continuity in government in a land that UNMIK 
took over largely from a state of chaos. 
While for the most part UNMIK and Serbia are at a stalemate over the 
Serbian parallel courts, in a couple of exceptional instances they have resolved 
some narrow part of the conflict. In July 2002, Serbia and UNMIK reached an 
                                                                                                                                                                         
70. It is not certain whether Serbia continues to do so today. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES 
REPORT, supra note 16, at 21; see also Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Baruti Interview, supra note 
31; Deja & Fejzullahu Interview, supra note 36; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29.  
71. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 17; OSCE TENTH MINORITY 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 29-32. UNMIK has not issued any direction to its courts as to how to 
handle judgments or communications coming from the Serbian parallel systems. It did establish a 
working group to address the problem in 2003; however, there has been no officially reported action 
since then. In 2003, the OSCE proposed a three-pronged approach to diminishing the role of the Serbian 
parallel system, including reducing demand through a public awareness campaign, reducing supply by 
assessing the Serbian parallel court caseload for future transfer and by improving working conditions for 
Serb judges within the UNMIK system, and enforcing policy by recognizing Serbian parallel court 
judgments up to the date when UNMIK opened courts in several Serb enclaves in 2003. OSCE 
PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 5-9. 
72. Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; 2005 PUBLIC OPINION 
SURVEY, supra note 46, at 8, 21 (indicating that 41% of Serbs surveyed “do not recognize the [UNMIK] 
courts in Kosovo,” and 80% of Serbs surveyed “follow Serbian law”). 
73. While UNMIK and Provisional Institution of Self-Government documents are to be issued 
in both Albanian and Serbian as well as English, this is still aspirational in many instances, and there are 
often significant delays in translation. See OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 
8-9; see also Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35. 
74. In a 2005 public opinion survey, public opinion survey, only 18% of Serbs reported 
having confidence in UNMIK.  2005 PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY, supra note 46, at 14. 
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agreement to permit Serbian parallel court judges to transfer to the UNMIK 
courts if they so desire. Under this agreement, Serbia continues to pay the 
judges’ higher Serbian benefits and pensions so that the judges do not incur 
the severe financial penalty of losing their pensions by switching teams. This 
was an entirely pragmatic compromise with the purpose of resolving one 
obstacle to the integration of Serb judges into the UNMIK system: that no one 
was going to be willing to give up their own personal financial security to 
facilitate UNMIK’s political goals.75 In another rare instance of cooperation, 
one U.N. agency, the Housing and Property Directorate (“HPD”), reached an 
agreement with the Serbian government permitting HPD access to all of 
Serbia’s records, including those from the parallel system, access that is not 
available to UNMIK otherwise. A contributing factor in this agreement is that 
rather than addressing the highly politicized questions of ethnic discrimination 
in pre- and post-1999 land transfers, HPD has a narrow, technical mandate: 
confirming the accuracy of claims of title as of 1999 against Serbian records 
and outside sources.76  
These instances of cooperation are highly unusual, representing a 
complete departure from the usual policy of non-recognition and non-
interaction. But while the success of each endeavor seems to be tied to the 
particular circumstances and is the result of political negotiations and 
strategies that are inaccessible to the external observer, there is at least one 
observable commonality. In each case, an issue was isolated from broader 
political concerns and treated as a discrete pragmatic question to be resolved 
independently. This provides some basis for optimism concerning an approach 
to the question of recognition of Serbian parallel court judgments that treats it 
as a narrow legal issue to be resolved independently of the associated political 
questions, according to legal rather than political principles. 
III. CIVIL JUDGMENTS 
Viewed from the perspective of a post-conflict administration, 
recognizing and enforcing the Serbian parallel court systems’ civil judgments 
might help to promote transitional goals of instituting rule of law or at least 
establishing social stability.77 First and foremost, doing so would be to the 
immediate benefit of the people of Kosovo who have been relying on these 
courts for their personal matters, large and small. It would institute legal 
certainty for the thousands of decisions made in the Serbian parallel system 
and forestall any opportunity for unscrupulous parties to take advantage of the 
potential for inconsistent rulings to defraud others trapped between the two 
                                                                                                                                                                         
75. Other conditions of the agreement included HPD’s promise to “use its best endeavours” to 
resolve the recruited judges’ and prosecutors’ property claims, UNMIK’s assurance of  “individualized 
security assessments” for the recruits, and Serbia’s assurance that they could return to positions in Serbia 
in the future. OSCE TENTH MINORITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 22. What Serbia got out of the 
bargain, apart from relief from the burden of paying recruited judges’ salaries, is unclear. An OSCE 
report indicates that eleven Serbian judges had moved to the UNMIK system as of late 2003, while my 
contacts indicated there were fewer than eleven in the UNMIK system as of May 2005. OSCE 
PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 21; Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic 
Interview, supra note 31. 
76. Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31. 
77. See generally Teitel, supra note 13. 
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systems.78 On the larger social and political scale, such recognition could help 
to restore confidence in future judgments and in the legal system as a whole, 
as well as relieving one element of pressure on the ongoing negotiations over 
Kosovo’s political status. If accusations of systemic unfairness or 
discrimination should arise, the consequences of such a result for confidence 
in the transition toward rule of law would force revisitation of these 
conclusions. At this point, however, without indicators of such problems, the 
reports of injustice focus on the gaps in enforcement created by non-
recognition between the systems. 
In this context, there is an important difference between the parallel 
courts’ civil and family law judgments, which are addressed in this Section, 
and the judgments that concern property and criminal law, addressed in 
following Sections. The substance of parallel court judgments on civil and 
family law relate for the most part to private business and personal disputes 
and not, as do the property and criminal judgments, to the catalysts of the 
Serbian-Albanian conflict or the goals of transitional justice.79 The transitional 
justice concerns raised by recognition of the Serbian parallel courts’ civil 
judgments thus relate primarily to the role of the parallel courts as institutions 
and the social and political effects of non-recognition, rather than to the 
substance of the judgments at issue.  
Viewed from the perspective of ordinary law, Kosovo’s parallel courts 
present a particularly acute and politicized version of an everyday legal 
problem not particular to the transitional justice process: whether and how to 
recognize legal decisions reached outside the auspices of the state-run judicial 
system. Indeed, courts face this issue all the time, when a plaintiff files an 
action seeking to enforce an arbitration award, a foreign judgment, or an out-
of-court settlement agreement, or when a defendant raises such a judgment or 
agreement as res judicata barring a second claim on the same facts.  
In the civil context, there are several legal models for recognizing these 
judgments in ways that will safeguard the rights and interests of the involved 
parties, as well as the core concepts of justice from which the judicial process 
derives its legitimacy. Of these, arbitration awards and settlements attain their 
legitimacy from the consent of the parties to resolve their dispute through 
arbitration or agreement, rather than from the inherent jurisdiction vested in a 
judicial institution. In addition, the fact that such out-of-court resolutions are 
recognized demonstrates that states can and do recognize certain private 
                                                                                                                                                                         
78. Of course, the risk that litigants will try to game gaps in recognition between systems to 
their advantage is inherent in any systems lacking complete mutual recognition. In Kosovo, there were 
allegations that miscreants had carried out fraudulent land transfers by playing on the lack of common 
property records and mutual non-recognition of property transfers to claim and transfer title to land they 
did not actually own. While it would certainly have been possible to carry out fraudulent transfers under 
such circumstances, no one with whom I spoke was in possession of specific evidence to substantiate or 
disprove these allegations. See interview with Dara Katz, Senior Human Rights Advisor (Property), 
Human Rights and Rule of Law, Org. for Sec. & Co-operation in Eur., in Priština/Prishtinё (May 26, 
2005) [hereinafter Katz Interview]; Baruti Interview, supra note 31. The OSCE has also identified this 
as a risk of a formal policy of non-recognition.  OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, 
at 22 (“[S]ome might take advantage of the uncertainty and stop paying alimony, or stop paying off 
loans, or attempt to seize transferred property”). 
79. See generally DANIEL LEWIS, UNHABITAT, CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINABLE PEACE: LAND 
DISPUTES FOLLOWING CONFLICT (2004). 
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judgments without ceding general jurisdiction, much less territorial 
sovereignty, in doing so. These models also offer a principle—consent—
against which to assess the fairness of recognizing such judgments that could 
be applied to the Serbian parallel court decisions. 
The models for recognizing foreign judgments, arbitration awards, and 
out-of-court settlements also offer useful technical solutions that could be 
adapted to Kosovo’s situation. In reviewing these decisions, courts confront 
the same kinds of concerns that arise now in Kosovo: conflicting judgments, 
questions about jurisdiction, concerns regarding the impartiality and fairness 
of non-state tribunals, and so on. The factors that other states have identified 
as being determinative for deciding recognition in any given case provide 
guidance as to the kinds of cases that can profitably be recognized and the 
appropriate considerations and trade-offs in doing so. The processes and 
standards that they have adopted are relevant for the Serbian parallel 
judgments in Kosovo as well. 
Finally, because these mechanisms have received widespread acceptance 
amongst European states and in the European Union, they also represent 
models that have already been legitimized and accepted by the international 
community in which both Serbia and Kosovo are eager to participate.80 Using 
models that are accepted as the norm within Europe therefore provides an 
external incentive for all the concerned parties—Serbia, Kosovo, and the 
international community itself—to accept the proposed resolution. 
While the technical details contained within these models help to 
illustrate how Kosovo could go about recognizing the parallel court judgments 
if it chose to do so, in the end, it is not these details that are crucial but rather 
the fact that there are such models that can facilitate recognition of the parallel 
court judgments while mitigating the risks of doing so. In short, the following 
models confirm that the Serbian parallel civil judgments are susceptible of 
legal recognition and enforcement, in spite of the obstacles to doing so:81 
                                                                                                                                                                         
80. Press Conference, Serbian Government, Citizens Favour Serbia’s Membership in EU 
(Nov. 6, 2006), http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=28598; The Officer of the Prime Minister 
of Kosovo, EU-Kosova Relations, http://www.ks-gov.net/pm/?menuid=9&subid=4&lingo=2.  
81. In selecting the models to review here, I have looked to European, U.S., and international 
law. The rules accepted in the European Union and in European civil law states represent Kosovo’s 
immediate legal community and comprise systems that are relatively consonant with its own. Within 
Europe, French law provides an approach that is grounded in a shared civil law structure, but at the same 
time offers some counterpoint to the heavily German-influenced Yugoslavian law that Kosovo has 
largely retained for now. Because the U.S. rules on foreign judgments apply to all foreign states rather 
than solely those to which it has a close relation, its concerns and solutions provide a useful contrast to 
European approaches. Finally, where there is international consensus in the form of a multilateral 
convention, I have taken account of this as well. 
Ordinarily, it would be appropriate to look first to the law of the concerned state. However, 
unwilling to make use of the Serbian laws that were in place at the time of the conflict in 1999, Kosovo 
has reverted temporarily to the pre-1989 law of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) for 
its law on recognition of civil judgments, among others. As such, the law currently in force in Kosovo 
does not represent the modern approach to these issues, which has developed considerably more detailed 
rules and streamlined proceedings over the last 20 years. Nor does it represent current or future 
preferences on these issues: the adoption of the pre-1989 law was merely an interim measure by the 
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to place some law on the books, and the 
provisional legislature is in the process of drafting new laws and codes across all areas of the legal 
system. Finally, because Kosovo is not a state, it is not a party to the relevant international treaties on 
these subjects. Accordingly, while I do review the relevant provisions from the SFRY law currently 
applicable in Kosovo, I do not discuss those provisions at any length. 
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• Arbitration: Recognition of international arbitration awards is 
primarily governed by the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York 
Convention”),82 which has been ratified, acceded, and succeeded to 
by over 130 states, including most if not all European states and all 
the states that were once part of the former Yugoslavia.83 The rules 
for recognition of domestic arbitration awards comprise part of the 
civil code and civil procedure code of most civil law countries, and 
the U.S. federal system is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. 
There is considerable convergence amongst these rules as well. For 
domestic arbitration, I consider French and U.S. law.84  
 
• Out-of-Court Settlements: Recognition of out-of-court settlements is 
governed by domestic civil codes, by civil procedure codes, or by 
common law, and is based upon principles of contract law. Again, I 
review the law of France and the United States.85 
 
• Foreign Judgments: Recognition of the judgments of other member 
states in the European Union is governed by European Council 
Regulations. 86  For contrast, I also review the Uniform Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act and the Revised Uniform 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which have been adopted by 
a majority of U.S. states.87 I also review the provisions of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia law currently applied in 
Kosovo that address recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.88 
                                                                                                                                                                         
82. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 3, 
adopted June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter New York Convention].  
83. See UNCITRAL Status of Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2006) (listing countries that have signed, ratified, acceded, or succeeded to New York 
Convention). 
84. On the French side, this encompasses the French Code of Civil Procedure and the French 
Civil Code; on the American side, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2000). 
85. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] (Fr.); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 1 (2000).  
86. Council Regulation 805/2004, Creating a European Enforcement Order for Uncontested 
Claims, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 15 (EC) [hereinafter Uncontested Claims Regulation]; Council Regulation 
44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 2000 O.J. (L 12) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation]; Council 
Regulation 2201/2003, Concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Matrimonial Matters and the Matters of Parental Responsibility, 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1 (EC) [hereinafter 
Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation]. 
87. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1994) [hereinafter 
RECOGNITION ACT]; REV. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1994) 
[hereinafter ENFORCEMENT ACT]; VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, 2 LITIGATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. COURTS § 20:3, at 20-8 (2d ed. 2006). 
88. Provisions under the SFRY law currently applicable in Kosovo concerning recognition 
and execution of arbitration awards and out of court settlements are too limited to provide the 
information necessary for this comparative analysis. Therefore, I focus here on the provisions 
concerning foreign judgments, which are more extensive. Law on Executive Procedure, Official Gazette 
of the Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugo. no. LU/1369/SE/ED (1982) (translation provided by author); 
Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugo. no. 
43/82 at 1077 (translation provided by author). 
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This Section begins with case studies of two recent civil cases that 
illustrate the issues at stake. It then proceeds topic by topic through the 
relevant aspects of arbitration, out-of-court settlement, and foreign judgment 
models, beginning with the question of sovereignty, then reviewing the 
respective default rules, and finally considering the grounds for non-
enforcement of these judgments. By adapting certain aspects from several of 
the models, UNMIK or the Kosovo government could develop a workable 
mechanism for recognizing most Serbian parallel judgments in a way it deems 
appropriate.   
A. Two Civil Cases 
UNMIK has no official policy on recognition of Serbian courts’ civil 
judgments, but its de facto position is that there has been and is to be no 
recognition.89 However, in individual cases, compelled by the equities of the 
situation, UNMIK courts and other administrative bodies find themselves 
pressed to determine how to address Serbian parallel court decisions.90   
In one currently pending case, for example, a Serb employee filed a 
claim in the Serbian courts within Kosovo for wrongful discharge against his 
former employer. After pursuing the claim in that system for four years, he 
received an adverse appellate decision that sent his case back for retrial in the 
trial court. Without withdrawing his first claim in the Serbian court, he then 
filed suit in the UNMIK court on the same grounds in 2005. When the 
defendant protested, producing the Serbian court judgments, the plaintiff 
asserted that he was not aware that he could file in the UNMIK courts until 
recently.91  
In spite of the UNMIK policy, the judge hesitated to proceed with the 
case in the face of the prior Serbian parallel judgments. Principles of fairness 
to the defendant, which had already defended its interests for four years in the 
Serbian courts, seemed to demand that the judgments of the Serbian courts be 
recognized, particularly since the plaintiff voluntarily pursued his claim there 
in the first place and did not seem to claim that the Serbian parallel courts 
made errors of procedure or law in their judgments. Not only this, if the judge 
were to allow the case to continue, she would risk exacerbating the already 
complex situation in the end, when both courts would produce their separate 
                                                                                                                                                                         
89. See OMBUDSPERSON SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 13, 21. 
90. The few official reports available on the parallel system describe civil cases raising similar 
issues to those discussed here.  E.g., OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 23 
(explaining that a litigant was unable to enforce Serbian parallel court decision on compensation for 
expropriation in UNMIK court).  The OSCE also reported that two individual Serbian parallel court 
presidents informed it that they had caseloads of hundreds of civil cases and inheritance proceedings 
between 1999-2003.  Id. at 19-20.  However, neither official judgments and other individual case 
records nor statistical or other general data are available for the Serbian parallel courts civil cases, so 
that it is impossible to offer any specific information on the number or nature of the civil cases in the 
system.  This is not happenstance, of course, but one more product of the same dynamic that has created 
the legal and pragmatic problems discussed in this article: the mutual non-recognition between the 
systems. 
91. Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Second Interview with Anonymous #11, in 
Priština/Prishtinё (May 26, 2005) (interviewee requested anonymity as a condition of providing this 
information). 
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judgments, one of which could be enforced in Serbia and the other in Kosovo, 
without regard for whether they might constitute a double penalty for the 
defendant.92  
The UNMIK courts’ inconsistent and unpredictable approach to 
recognition and enforcement of Serbian court judgments has exacerbated 
uncertainty, confusion, and opportunities for arbitrage. This is also illustrated 
by another Serbian parallel court case. Here, a Serbian parallel court in 
Kosovo issued a divorce and ordered the husband to pay alimony. When he 
failed to do so, the Serbian parallel court had no means to enforce the alimony 
judgment against him, so his ex-wife went to an UNMIK court to enforce it. 
That court refused to enforce the judgment on the grounds that Serbian 
parallel court decisions were invalid. However, at around the same time, the 
UNMIK offices in Leposavić/Leposaviq recognized the judgment as requested 
by the ex-husband for purposes of declaring him an unmarried person. When 
the plaintiff, thwarted in her effort to enforce the original divorce decree, then 
filed a new complaint for divorce on the same grounds and with the same 
conditions in the UNMIK court in Mitrovicё/Mitrovica, her ex-/husband 
successfully defended on the grounds that the divorce had already been 
recognized by UNMIK, and that to divorce him again would be in conflict 
with that determination.93   
These cases illustrate that in the context of the Serbian parallel civil 
judgments, certainty and predictability are the dominant concerns. The parties 
in these cases do not contest the fairness of the Serbian parallel proceeding; 
rather it is the existence of the opportunity for multiple proceedings that 
creates confusion and harm. Indeed, the balance of interests is so much in 
favor of certainty in this context that arguably it would be better for UNMIK 
to adopt a rule—any rule—regarding Serbian parallel court judgments than 
none at all, so that at least its own approach would be internally consistent and 
it would be more difficult for parties to abuse legal processes. Fortunately, 
UNMIK has ample models to draw from in constructing a rule for addressing 
the civil judgments of the Serbian parallel courts. 
B. Bypassing Sovereignty as the Basis for Jurisdiction 
A central obstacle to recognition of Serbian parallel civil judgments is 
not the characteristics of the judgments themselves, but UNMIK’s 
determination to avoid taking any steps that would seem to affirm Serbian 
parallel court jurisdiction over the territory of Kosovo, either in the past or in 
the future. While state authority is an essential prerequisite for recognition of 
foreign judgments, it is not relevant to recognition of arbitration awards and 
out-of-court settlements. In such cases, the legal foundation for recognition of 
the judgment or settlement is the initial agreement of the parties to decide the 
matter by arbitration or contract, rather than any inherent, broader jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                                                         
92. Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Second Interview with Anonymous #11, in 
Priština/Prishtinё (May 26, 2005) (interviewee requested anonymity as a condition of providing this 
information). 
93. First Interview with Anonymous #11, in Priština/Prishtinё (May 23, 2005) (interviewee 
requested anonymity as a condition of providing this information). 
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based in the authority of the state. By treating Serbian parallel court 
judgments either as arbitration awards or as out-of-court settlements, Kosovo 
could leapfrog the crucial question of sovereignty and facilitate the 
recognition of Serbian parallel judgments without conceding the Serbian 
parallel courts’ legitimacy as such. Indeed, treating Serbian parallel court 
judgments as arbitration agreements or out-of-court settlements would signal 
exactly the contrary conclusion: that the courts do not have any independent 
jurisdiction, but rather, are dependent upon the acquiescence of the parties for 
any jurisdiction over civil matters. 
Here, comparing the international and domestic rules on recognition of 
arbitration awards, out-of-court settlements, and foreign judgments reveals the 
contrast between the approaches: 
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94. New York Convention, supra note 82, art. II(1). 
95. N.C.P.C., arts. 1442-50 (Fr.); C. CIV., arts. 2059-61 (Fr.); see generally Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2000). 
96. C. CIV. art. 2045 (Fr.), 15A AM.JUR.2D Compromise and Settlement §§ 2, 9-10, 39 (2000). 
97. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 2-26; Matrimonial/Parental 
Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 2-3, 6-14. Because the regulation on uncontested money 
judgments deals primarily with default judgments, it sets minimum standards of notice and service to the 
defendant, rather than rules of jurisdiction. Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 12-18. 
98. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 87, § 4(a)(2)-(3); ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87, § 2. 
99. Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic 
of Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, arts. 86-87; Law on Executive Procedure, Official Gazette of the Socialist 
Fed. Republic of Yugo. no. LU/1369/SE/ED, art. 12 (1982). 
100. Non-commercial jurisdiction is determined by national laws. New York Convention, 
supra note 82, art. II. 
101. E.g., C. CIV. arts. 2059-60 (Fr.); N.C.P.C., arts. 1442 & 1448 (Fr.); Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
102. C. CIV. arts. 2044 & 2046 (Fr.); N.C.P.C., art. 127 (Fr.); 15A AM.JUR.2D Compromise and 
Settlement §§ 5, 38 & 40 (2000). 
103. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, art. 1; Matrimonial/Parental 
Judgments Regulation, supra note 86; Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra note 87, art. 2. 
104. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 87, § 1 (excluding taxes, fines, & family support); 
ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87, § 1. 
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The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements underlines the notion 
that the parties’ consent provides not just a possible but a desirable basis for 
recognizing and enforcing judgments. The Convention is the most recently 
concluded international consensus on the subject and has not yet entered into 
force.106 When it does so, the Convention will extend the principle of consent 
to determining the jurisdiction of ordinary state courts, permitting parties to 
certain international disputes to select their preferred forum from among the 
courts of the states parties to the Convention by entering into exclusive choice 
of court agreements.107  It will require courts to respect the choice of the 
parties insofar as possible under relevant law and provides for mandatory 
recognition and enforcement of judgments on that basis, albeit with some 
exceptions and limits.108  
Furthermore, a recognition mechanism that extended the arbitration and 
out-of-court settlement recognition models from their usual contexts to the 
Serbian parallel courts’ civil judgments would not be cut from whole cloth. 
Other states have used arbitration award and contract models to recognize the 
judgments of non-state institutions, such as the decisions of religious judges 
and tribunals. 109  In deploying these models, courts have grounded the 
legitimacy of religious institutions’ legal decisions in the same basis as the 
legitimacy of arbitration awards and contracts: the consent of the parties. 
Indeed, a paramount consideration is assessing the genuine agreement of the 
parties to participate in and be governed by the relevant religious law. In 
doing so, courts have used the standard tools of contract law that are used to 
assess consent in the arbitration and settlement contexts.110   
Nor does recognizing decisions from alternative institutions on the basis 
of the parties’ agreement mean accepting any decision reached on that basis, 
even if fraudulent, made under duress, or otherwise fundamentally unjust. 
Instead, as will be discussed below, the rules for recognition of arbitration 
agreements and out-of-court settlements offer ample grounds for refusing to 
recognize a decision tainted by misconduct or malfeasance. The use of such 
rules in the context of these other, non-state tribunals and decisions is well-
established and indeed, crucial to recognition and enforcement: Courts have 
refused to enforce religious decisions in cases where they found duress or 
other forms of pressure, a failure to meet minimal requirements of due 
                                                                                                                                                                         
105. Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic 
of Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, arts. 86, 93-94. 
106. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter 
Choice of Court Convention] (not yet in force). 
107. Id. arts. 1-4. 
108. Id. arts. 5-9. 
109. U.S. and Canadian courts have used arbitration agreements and contract law to enforce 
rabbinic decisions on marriage and family issues and to recognize religious marriages that do not meet 
the formal requirements of the civil system.  Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in 
American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540, 578-86 (2004) (U.S.); Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and 
the Problem of Gender: New Modes of Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Societies, 50 MCGILL 
L.J. 49, 73-77 (2005) (Can.).  States have also used the recognition of foreign judgments model to 
recognize judgments of tribal courts and other entities with at least limited sovereignty. E.g., Gordon K. 
Wright, Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1410-11 (1985).  
110. Estin, supra note 109, at 585. 
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process, or where important elements of public policy are absent, such as 
consideration of the interests of the children in a divorce proceeding.111   
Following these models, Kosovo could ground its recognition of Serbian 
parallel court civil judgments on the basis of the voluntary agreement of the 
parties to participate in the Serbian parallel proceedings, rather than in the 
asserted territorial jurisdiction of the Serbian parallel courts. In Kosovo’s case, 
ascertaining such agreement would likely be approached most effectively in a 
categorical, formalistic way, presuming the acquiescence of the parties in all 
cases in which both parties actively participated, on the basis of the plaintiff’s 
decision to file and the defendant’s decision to appear in the Serbian parallel 
court. This approach would have the advantage of creating widespread legal 
certainty regarding Serbian parallel judgments instantaneously and of being 
easily applied to a large number of cases at once. 
Of course, this consent would be in at least some cases a legal fiction. In 
the context of arbitration and out-of-court settlements, both parties have in 
fact agreed to the out-of-court resolution of their dispute with the option of an 
in court resolution before them. For cases heard in the early years of the 
UNMIK administration, the parties will often have had no alternative but the 
Serbian parallel courts, and so their consent can readily be presumed. In later 
years, however, at least some defendants will likely have had a preference for 
the UNMIK courts that they had no opportunity to express. Even under a 
categorical, formulaic approach that presumes willing participation, it would 
be possible to offer the opportunity for parties to request individual 
reconsideration of their cases, for example, if a defendant could present 
evidence of nonconsent such as nonparticipation or active protest of parallel 
court jurisdiction. However, based on the reports of those I interviewed and 
the formal reports and assessments of the situation in Kosovo, a formulaic 
approach seems likely to capture the reality that in most instances, the parties 
were in fact willing to make use of the Serbian parallel system to resolve their 
disputes.  
This determination could, however, also be made in a case-by-case 
review of the indications of the parties’ consent. This would have the 
advantage of permitting reconsideration of cases in which parties felt 
pressured to use the Serbian parallel courts or did not realize that they had an 
alternative. However, such case-by-case assessment would be highly 
burdensome, especially for an already backlogged judiciary. Furthermore, the 
courts are not likely to have access to independent evidence of the parties’ 
intent beyond the testimony of the parties themselves, as it is unlikely that any 
record remains of the parties’ positions at the time. This would make it 
difficult to find a basis for resolving conflicting claims. Accordingly, this 
approach might well introduce more uncertainty than it resolves, as well as 
offering opportunities for disgruntled litigants to use the review process to 
reopen their claims.  
Applying a consent-based approach to the employment and divorce 
cases discussed above would provide a basis for recognizing the Serbian 
parallel court judgment in both cases. To the extent that it is possible to 
                                                                                                                                                                         
111. Id. at 584-85. 
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ascertain consent after the fact, the parties seem to have voluntarily 
participated in the Serbian parallel proceedings, and it was not until an 
opportunity for forum-shopping arose that parties sought to remove 
themselves from those proceedings. Under either a categorical rule looking to 
whether the parties in fact took part in the case or a more detailed analysis of 
the agreement of these individual parties, Kosovo could base its recognition of 
the Serbian parallel judgments in these cases on the parties’ agreement and 
bypass the question of Serbian parallel court territorial jurisdiction over their 
claims.   
C. Framework for Recognition: A Default Rule and Exceptions 
There is considerable consensus, especially among European states, on 
the standards and procedures for recognizing foreign judgments, arbitral 
awards, and out-of-court settlements. While states deploy a range of standards 
and procedures for recognizing foreign judgments, arbitral awards, and out-of-
court settlements (as discussed in Section III.D below), most use the same 
basic framework: a default rule either for or against recognition, with certain 
exceptions. Where there is no law or agreement in place on recognition of 
foreign judgments, the default rule is against recognition, as it is concerning 
the Serbian parallel court judgments in Kosovo. As is occurring now in 
Kosovo, the legal uncertainty this creates and the associated social, economic, 
and judicial burdens have provided an incentive for states to develop a 
streamlined and determinative approach to recognition of these judgments and 
other agreements. 112  In passing laws regarding recognition of non-state 
judgments and agreements, therefore, states typically set a new default rule at 
the opposite extreme, mandating full recognition for legitimate judgments and 











                                                                                                                                                                         
112. For example, both the European Council Regulations and the U.S. Uniform Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act refer to the interest in securing efficient common markets and 
interchanges. See e.g., Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86; RECOGNITION ACT, 
supra note 87, Prefatory Note, at 1. 
113. The Convention on Choice of Court Agreements discussed above in Section III.A also 
takes the same approach. Choice of Court Convention, supra note 106, arts. 8-9.  
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Establishing such a default rule, while efficient, would, of course, 
reverse the current presumption concerning the Serbian parallel courts in 
Kosovo. It also may appear at first glance to provide no opportunity to address 
UNMIK’s concerns regarding conflicting judgments, partiality, and so on.  
But while the default rules appear absolute and uniform, they do not 
determine the level of recognition that each model actually offers. Rather, as 
discussed below, the level of scrutiny applied to the judgment or agreement in 
determining recognition varies considerably between the models according to 
the process and grounds for contesting recognition. Indeed, precisely because 
the default rules are so strongly in favor of recognition, it is the exceptions 
that determine the true scope of the rule and define the relevant issues for 
whether a judgment should be recognized.   
The benefit of establishing a pro-recognition default rule, of course, is 
creating immediate certainty in the judgments issued in the majority of cases 
and also increasing efficiency for litigants and courts alike in enforcing those 
judgments. Accordingly, this approach is most beneficial when there are many 
                                                                                                                                                                         
114. New York Convention, supra note 82, art. 3. 
115. C. CIV. arts. 1476-78 (Fr.).  
116. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000). 
117. C. CIV. arts. 2044, 2052 (Fr.); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement §§ 32, 37, 39 
(2000). 
118. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, pmbl. ¶ 17. The E.U. requires 
mandatory, automatic recognition of the judgments of the courts of member states upon the mere 
presentation by the enforcing party of the relevant paperwork. Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra 
note 86, arts. 5-6, 20; Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, art. 41; 
Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, art. 21. 
119. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 87, § 3. 
120. ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87, § 2. 
121. Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic 
of Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, arts. 86-87, 92, 96. 
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cases that can properly be enforced under such a default rule, and only a few 
cases that will present grounds for non-enforcement. To some extent, 
therefore, the choice of default rule should depend on an assessment of the 
standard that is likely to accurately capture the majority of cases.  
D. Grounds and Procedures for Non-Recognition 
UNMIK’s primary concern regarding recognizing Serbian parallel civil 
judgments is, of course, the sovereignty claims discussed above. But there are 
other concerns as well, among them the risk of recognizing conflicting 
judgments; fears that Serbian parallel proceedings have suffered from 
partiality, political decision-making or other lack of independence; and the 
potential effects on the rights of third parties affected by the judgment but 
unwilling or unable to participate in the Serbian parallel proceedings.   
The models for recognition of foreign judgments, arbitral awards, and 
out-of-court settlements consider and address these concerns by providing a 
set of enumerated grounds on which courts can decline to recognize otherwise 
enforceable judgments. 122  While there is a broad range of enumerated 
exceptions amongst the different models, the exceptions that are common to at 
least two of the models (as described below) encompass the concerns that 
UNMIK has raised in considering the problem of the Serbian parallel courts:  
 
a) conflict with another judgment; 
b) lack of jurisdiction;  
c) lack of opportunity for the defendant to participate; 
d) public policy; 
e) fraud; and 
f) due process.123 
 
Another consideration that is raised solely in the context of domestic 
arbitration agreements, but which deserves attention in light of the divided 
society in which the Serbian parallel courts operate, is the effect on the rights 





                                                                                                                                                                         
122. In the laws and agreements governing recognition of arbitration awards and of foreign 
judgments, there are a limited, enumerated set of exceptions that provide a basis for a party to contest 
recognition and enforcement. In the context of out of court settlements, the grounds for non-enforcement 
are based primarily in contract law. The validity of this set of exceptions has been recently confirmed in 
the Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements, the most recently negotiated multilateral consensus on 
enforcement of foreign judgments of courts chosen by the parties.  With the exception of due process, 
the Convention’s enumerated grounds for non-enforcement are identical to this set of common grounds. 
Choice of Court Convention, supra note 106, art. 9.   
123. See infra Table 3. 
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124. New York Convention, supra note 82, art. V (all listed grounds). 
125. C. CIV. arts. 1480, 1483 (Fr.) (all listed French grounds); Arbitration Act, supra note 84, 
§§ 10-11 (all listed U.S. grounds). 
126. C. CIV. arts. 2053-56 (Fr.) (all listed French grounds); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and 
Settlement §§ 34, 39, 41 (2000) (all listed U.S. grounds). 
127. Because the process for recognizing and enforcing uncontested claims is even more 
streamlined than the process for enforcing other judgments, the only ground for non-enforcement is a 
conflicting judgment. Accordingly, except for conflicting judgments, this chart reflects the grounds 
applicable in civil/commercial and matrimonial/parental cases. Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra 
note 86, art. 21; Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 33-37; 
Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 22-26. 
128. The Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act does not provide specific 
grounds for non-enforcement, but rather, indicates that the judgment “is subject to the same procedures, 
defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a [court] of this state.” 
ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87, § 2. Because these grounds for non-enforcement vary state by state, 
this chart includes only the particular grounds set out by the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments 
Recognition Act. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 87, § 4. 
129. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 33-37; Matrimonial/Parental 
Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 22(c)-(d), 23(e)-(f). 
130. Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic 
of Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, art. 90. 
131. These special jurisdictional provisions deal specifically with insurance cases, consumer 
cases, cases designated for exclusive jurisdiction, and prior agreements by Member States concerning 
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the court is not permitted to review the original court’s jurisdiction. 
Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, art. 35. However, the extensive rules on 
jurisdiction established earlier in the Regulation stand; it is simply that they cannot be reconsidered post-
judgment. Rather, “[t]he reasoning underlying the general prohibition of a review of the original court’s 
jurisdiction is that the court of origin is as well able to judge the applicability of the Brussels-Lugano 
regime as the court of the state addressed, and better able than the latter to apply its own law.” 1 
EUROPEAN CIVIL PRACTICE § 26.096, at 940-41 (Alexander Layton et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004).  That is, 
enforcing the jurisdictional rules is primarily the responsibility of the original court, not the 
recognizing/enforcing court, underlining the importance of mutual confidence between the courts of 
member states. 
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Apart from the substantive grounds for contesting recognition, the other 
crucial issue is the process available to do so. In the European Union, 
confidence in member states’ courts is relatively high in comparison to U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
132. However, in cases concerning marriage, the defendant can consent to recognition 
nonetheless. Law on Conflicts of Laws, July 23, 1982, Official Gazette of the Socialist Fed. Republic of 
Yugo. no. 43/82 at 1077, art. 89 (translation provided by author).  
133. Id. at 1077, art. 88. In cases concerning personal status, this ground for non-recognition 
applies only to citizens. Id. at 1077, art. 94. 
134. Id. at 1077, art. 91. This ground for non-recognition also applies only to citizens in 
personal status cases. See id. at 1077, art. 94. 
135. Reciprocity is presumed unless there is reason to believe otherwise. There are exceptions 
for cases concerning marriage or parenthood. Id. at 1077, art. 92. 
136. The treatment of cases concerning personal status varies depending on the citizenship of 
the parties, and there are additional opportunities for the parties to waive grounds for non-recognition. 
Id. at 1077, arts. 92-95. 
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confidence in foreign courts and Kosovo’s confidence in the Serbian parallel 
courts. 137  As such, the process set forth in the E.C. regulations favors 
maximum efficiency: It is “virtually automatic;” the judgment shall be 
declared enforceable “immediately on completion of the formalities,” without 
consideration of any of the grounds of non-recognition; and the defendant 
“has no right to make any submission on the application” before it is declared 
enforceable.138 But in most other models, the initial proceeding is adversarial, 
and the defendant has the opportunity to object to recognition and 
enforcement and to raise grounds for non-recognition or non-enforcement in 
that initial proceeding.139 In essence, the more uncertainty exists about the 
fairness of the original process and the impartiality of the original tribunal, the 
more scrutiny the state will build into the process of determining recognition.   
1. Contrast between E.U. & U.S. Foreign Judgment Models 
Here, it is worth comparing the contrasting rules applied by the E.U. and 
the U.S. in recognition of foreign judgments, for they demonstrate both the 
definitive role played by the exceptions to the general default rule and the 
essential relationship between ease of recognition and certainty about the 
legitimacy of the judgment. As to the first issue, the E.U.’s default rule in 
favor of recognition is reinforced by the highly streamlined, almost automatic 
                                                                                                                                                                         
137. Here, and at other points throughout this section, I refer to the relatively high level of 
confidence amongst European courts and to the relatively high level of agreement on the terms and 
conditions for recognition of judgment. Of course, the E.U. rules on recognition of judgments were top-
down rules, created at the European Union level, and do not necessarily represent the subjective views 
of all members.   However, there is no doubt that the E.U. system is “based on the principle of mutual 
trust between the legal systems and judicial institutions of the Member States . . . .” 1 EUROPEAN CIVIL 
PRACTICE, supra note 127, at 286. Nor are these comments meant to suggest that the process of 
implementing these E.U. regulations is necessarily complete or absolute. The regulations do, however, 
govern all members.  See BERNHARD HOFSTÖTTER, NON-COMPLIANCE OF NATIONAL COURTS: REMEDIES 
IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND BEYOND 9-12, 41-42 (2005) (discussing the direct applicability of 
E.U. law and the responsibility of national courts to issue decisions “in conformity with Community law 
as interpreted by the ECJ” (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, while each member state may not 
necessarily have a subjectively high level of confidence in the courts of another member state, it 
nevertheless receives the benefits of the safeguards for minimum baselines of process provided by the 
E.U. structures. It is also subject to the uniform requirements of the E.U. regulations in recognizing and 
enforcing member state judgments and to the authority of the European Court of Justice. These 
conditions put the European Union states in a different position from either the United States or Kosovo, 
both in terms of relative levels of confidence in the judgments they enforce, relative levels of 
willingness to enforce those judgments, and the kinds of safeguards that secure that willingness. For 
discussions of various aspects of the development and implementation of the E.U. recognition and 
enforcement rules, see, for example, Ronald A. Brand, The European Union’s New Role in International 
Private Litigation, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 277 (2005); Nicholas Bala et al., Regulating Cross-
Border Child Support Within Federated Systems, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 102 
(2005); Yvonne N. Gierczyk, The Evolution of the European Legal System, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
153, 160-72 (2005); Catherine Kessedjian, Sir Kenneth Bailey Memorial Lecture: Dispute Resolution in 
a Complex International Society, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 765, 793-96 (2005); 1 EUROPEAN CIVIL 
PRACTICE, supra note 127, at 276-371.  
138. Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, art. 31; Uncontested Claims 
Regulation, supra note 86; Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, pmbl. ¶ 17 & art. 
41. 
139. New York Convention, supra note 82 (following procedure of state where the judgment is 
relied on); C. CIV. (Fr.) (no right of participation); 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-12 (right of participation); 15A AM. 
JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 49 (2000) (right of participation); RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 
87 (right of participation); ENFORCEMENT ACT, supra note 87 (follows procedure of enforcing state). 
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procedure described above, and a very narrow set of grounds for non-
recognition, whereas the similar U.S. default rule is limited by an adversarial 
proceeding vesting considerable leeway in the judge to consider far broader 
grounds for non-recognition. 
As to the second issue, at the most fundamental level, this contrast in 
procedures and safeguards is an expression of the essential difference between 
the relationship amongst the E.U. member states and the relationship between 
the United States and other foreign nations, a difference that bears upon the 
choice of an appropriate model for Kosovo. The E.C. Regulations are founded 
in the agreement of all member states to provide reciprocal recognition of 
each other’s judgments. The enforcement procedures described above are 
limited to the relatively small number of states that are subject to a common 
legal regime enforced through E.U. institutions, including the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice, and that share relatively similar legal systems and 
other common interests and incentives to compliance. The United States, in 
contrast, is in a position far more analogous to Kosovo’s. Lacking an 
agreement for reciprocity in recognition of its judgments, the United States 
applies its more stringent enforcement procedures to review the judgments of 
all foreign states without the benefit of common interests or similar legal rules 
and without the safeguards of an overarching legal and political structure.   
In particular, the basis for the E.U.’s generous rule is two conditions that 
are manifestly absent in Kosovo: agreement on jurisdiction and mutual 
confidence, generated at least in part by the jurisdictional agreements and by 
final interpretation in a single court (the European Court of Justice).140 The 
E.C. Regulations ensure the first by setting out extensive jurisdictional rules 
that must be met by the court issuing the original judgment for the judgment 
to be recognized, and achieve the second by coordinating these agreements on 
recognition with initiatives to create common minimum standards for 
procedural protections and some degree of harmonization of national laws.141 
The benefit of this approach is obvious. By shifting the burden of ensuring 
proper jurisdiction, procedural protections, and reasonably consonant 
substantive rules to the front end, the E.U. achieves efficiency and certainty in 
recognition practice. The trade-off is also obvious: The risk of enforcing 
repugnant judgments should those preliminary safeguards fail. But as 
discussed above, in the E.U. context, this risk is largely mitigated by the 
existence of legal and political structures ensuring compliance with the 
regulations’ requirements.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
140. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, pmbl. ¶¶ 11, 16. 
141. Id. arts. 1(1), 2-24; Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supra note 86, arts. 1, 3-
14; KOEN LENAERTS ET AL., PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, §§ 1-015 to 1-016 (Robert 
Bray ed., 2d ed. 2006). This is possible, of course, precisely because the scope of the common 
recognition is limited to E.U. member countries. The EC Regulations establish only three basic 
prerequisites for enforcement:  The judgment must be from the court of a member state, it must be 
within the legal subject area of the regulation, and the original jurisdiction must have met the 
regulation’s jurisdictional rules. Civil/Commercial Judgments Regulation, supra note 86; 
Matrimonial/Parental Judgments Regulation, supra note 86.  Also, as noted above, the regulation on 
uncontested money judgments focuses on minimum standards of notice and service rather than 
jurisdiction. Uncontested Claims Regulation, supra note 86.  
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The U.S. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act presents 
a useful contrasting rule, one aimed at facilitating recognition of judgments 
when the court has no prior assurance as to either the competence or 
jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is before it. The U.S. rule also 
creates a presumption in favor of recognition, but it is a much weaker one. 
While the European procedure for enforcement allows submissions by the 
defendant and consideration of the grounds for non-recognition only on appeal 
to a designated court, U.S. courts consider these matters in the initial 
proceeding. The U.S. rules give the court leeway to refuse to enforce the 
judgment not only for all the reasons listed above, but also for fraud, a prior 
agreement to settle out-of-court, if the original court was a “seriously 
inconvenient forum” (in cases in which jurisdiction was based solely on 
personal service), and significantly, if the original judicial system lacks due 
process or impartial tribunals overall.142 This latter proceeding is much more 
burdensome, and the result much more uncertain, but the court at last gets an 
assurance of the workings of the other system during the proceeding itself.   
Neither model for recognition of foreign judgments could be applied 
directly in Kosovo, for both depend on recognition of state authority for 
recognition of a state court’s judgments. But the grounds for non-enforcement 
used in these models confirm the importance of UNMIK’s concerns with 
conflicting judgments, safeguarding defendants’ right to participate, and 
public policy. And the contrasts between the standards and procedures applied 
when states have more or less certainty about the other state’s court system 
suggest the practical choices that UNMIK or a subsequent Kosovo 
government could use to calibrate its scrutiny of the judgments: automatic 
recognition and enforcement versus contested proceedings, the level of 
specificity governing judicial decision-making, and the range of grounds for 
non-enforcement. 
2. Contrast between Arbitration Award and Out of Court 
Settlement Models 
The grounds for non-recognition of arbitration awards and out-of-court 
settlements address additional concerns that are relevant to the Serbian 
parallel courts. In both models, enforcing courts focus on the validity of the 
original agreement between the parties. As discussed above, this represents 
the fundamental legal ground for the legitimacy of the decision. 
But the two categories contrast starkly in how they approach the 
significance of the process provided in the initial proceeding. In the review of 
arbitral awards, the fairness of the process used to reach the award is crucial, 
both in terms of whether it comported with the parties’ agreement and whether 
it adhered to due process standards. But in recognizing out-of-court 
settlements, process is irrelevant. Rather, out-of-court settlements could be 
reached by virtually any means—a roll of the dice, a bet, or reasoned 
negotiation—so long as neither party was coerced by fraud, duress, or 
reasonable mistake. Here, the trade-off between efficiency and certainty on 
                                                                                                                                                                         
142. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 87, § 4. 
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the one hand, and confidence in the fairness of the process on the other, is at 
its most absolute. 
In assessing the applicability of these models to the cases described 
above, both the employment case and the divorce case, the primary risk is of 
conflicting judgments. There do not seem to have been allegations that the 
Serbian parallel court proceedings themselves presented a risk of fraud, due 
process violations, or conflicts with Kosovo’s public policy. To the contrary, 
it is the tension between the dual proceedings that presents these risks. In both 
cases, it seems that the parties originally acquiesced to have their case heard in 
the Serbian parallel courts and that, again, it is the violation of that agreement 
by a party forum-shopping for a better result that presents a risk to the 
fundamental fairness of the proceedings. 
The categories on which there is broad consensus between the models—
agreement of the parties/jurisdiction, conflicting judgments, fraud, public 
policy, and an opportunity for affected parties to participate—seem to present 
ample safeguards for recognition of only those Serbian parallel court 
judgments that are essentially fair and legitimate. If UNMIK were to adapt 
one or more of these models, it could then calibrate its framework to the 
desired balance between promoting legal certainty and assuring the legitimacy 
of the judgments by making calculated decisions about the level of scrutiny to 
be applied, the procedures to be used, and the extent of judicial discretion.   
E. A Civil Judgment Model  
These mechanisms provide a robust set of models for Kosovo to draw 
from in recognizing at least some civil Serbian parallel court cases. For the 
parties in civil cases in Kosovo, the best approach may be to select particular 
aspects from each of these models, as they are determined to be most 
appropriate for Kosovo’s unique circumstances. The arbitration award and 
out-of-court settlement models provide a basis for using the agreement of the 
parties, rather than the territorial jurisdiction of the Serbian parallel courts, as 
the legal justification for recognition. The default rule favoring enforcement, 
which is common to all the models, and the automatic initial recognition and 
enforcement process of the E.C. Regulations would together present the most 
immediately effective way of recognizing the entire category of civil 
judgments at once, thereby introducing substantial certainty to the majority of 
civil Serbian parallel cases. So long as the grounds for non-enforcement 
appropriately safeguard other interests by permitting affected parties to object 
on appeal based on conflicting judgments issued by UNMIK courts, a lack of 
opportunity for parties or affected third parties to participate, and other 
identified factors, this model would create substantial legal certainty with few 
apparent downsides, and without requiring recognition of Serbian parallel 
court jurisdiction per se. Particularly in the transitional justice context in 
which substantial legal, political, and social uncertainties are inevitable, 
promoting legal certainty and enabling ordinary people to go on with their 
everyday lives is no small benefit. 
Of course, particularly in the highly contentious context of negotiations 
over Kosovo’s political status, there is a risk that Serbia will treat any 
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recognition of parallel court judgments as recognition of territorial jurisdiction 
and political sovereignty as well, regardless of UNMIK’s legal rationale. Such 
a risk, while real, is no greater than the ever-present risk that virtually any 
action might be mischaracterized by politicians for political gain. More 
importantly, recognizing the parallel judgments on one of these alternative 
bases will not result in any change to the positions of the parties over 
Kosovo’s political status nor to the relative strength of their bargaining 
positions. Irrespective of UNMIK’s position on the matter, in the ongoing 
negotiations over Kosovo’s status, Serbia is claiming authority over Kosovo 
and points to the parallel courts in the Serb enclaves as one indicator of its 
ongoing role. Absent an open concession of Serbian sovereignty by UNMIK, 
recognition of parallel court judgments is unlikely to be a salient factor in the 
result.   
Another position taken by Serbia is, however, highly relevant to this 
discussion—Serbia’s demands that, even if Kosovo were granted 
independence, the parallel courts and administrative structures should not be 
dismantled but rather should continue to be active in the enclaves to protect 
the Serb minority’s interests. 143  It is one thing to establish an entirely 
retrospective system for recognizing past judgments, with the imperatives of 
the parties’ reliance on judgments already issued and executed, the desire to 
promote social stability, and the reality that many of these judgments were 
issued during a transitional period when UNMIK courts were either non-
existent or relatively inaccessible. If, however, during the political 
negotiations over Kosovo’s status the province accedes to Serbia’s position on 
this point, it will be necessary to craft a forward-looking practice of 
recognition with a deliberate balance between the demands of certainty and 
fairness in light of the Serbian parallel courts’ association with an enclaved 
Serb minority. At this point, the normative imperative for creative decision-
making based on the exigencies of the transitional period will fade away, and 
Kosovo will find itself in a position much like that occupied by other societies 
tolerating long-term situations of legal pluralism, driven by the everyday 
concerns of accommodating ethnic and religious minorities.   
A final concern that might be raised about general recognition of the 
Serbian parallel courts’ civil judgments is the risk of ratifying systemic inter-
ethnic discrimination within the court systems. To my surprise, while I 
inquired repeatedly about any incidents of systemic inter-ethnic discrimination 
in the Serbian parallel courts’ civil and family judgments, none of those 
interviewed for this Article (who included Kosovo Albanians, Serbians, and 
members of the international community) claimed to know of any such cases, 
and I found no official reports suggesting that such problems had arisen. This 
is particularly striking since even dubious rumors of perceived discrimination 
are typically the subject of widespread discussion. It is also remarkable 
because, as will be discussed shortly, such concerns are not only present but 
central in the property and criminal contexts.   
                                                                                                                                                                         
143. UN Positive After Kosovo Meeting, BBC NEWS.COM, Feb. 21, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4731142.stm. 
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While it is impossible to know how much confidence should be placed 
in collective silence on the subject, in Kosovo’s social context, it is plausible 
that there could in fact be a difference in treatment of civil and family cases as 
compared to property and criminal matters. Because Serbs and Albanians 
have lived in discrete communities for some time now, there are far fewer 
inter-ethnic families, businesses and other social and economic arrangements 
than there once were, and thus there are likely more intra-Serb and fewer 
inter-ethnic family, civil, and commercial cases in the Serbian parallel system 
as well. In contrast, land seizures and violence have been an integral part of 
the inter-ethnic conflict in Kosovo, and so contentious cases concerning these 
issues might be expected to carry on. In the same light, because land 
ownership and inter-ethnic violence are highly charged issues in Kosovo, such 
cases might be deliberately targeted by litigants or court officials in the 
parallel system to serve political ends, and once within the system, they could 
be more likely targets for discriminatory treatment in the courts, as they are in 
the society as a whole.144 
If accusations of systemic unfairness or discrimination within the 
Serbian parallel courts’ civil process should develop, the specter of enforcing 
systematically discriminatory decisions and the consequences of such a result 
for confidence in the transition toward rule of law would force revisitation of 
these conclusions. But at this point, without indicators of such problems, the 
reports of injustice focus on the gaps in enforcement created by non-
recognition between the systems and militate toward recognition. 
F. An Exception for Property  
One exception to this general approach in the civil judgments context is 
disputes over title to land.145 Property transactions and claims are an area in 
which the risk of inconsistent judgments and records is relatively high. The 
war in 1999 created uncertainty about title to land on a range of levels. Most 
importantly, there were several massive, unplanned movements of peoples in 
a short time span,146 and many of the cadastral records were taken, lost or 
destroyed.147 Since 1999, the parallel systems have been operating in tandem 
to certify land sales, creating separate cadastral records for the same territory. 
There seems to be a general consensus amongst those working on these issues 
that the Serbian parallel cadastral offices have been offering only provisional 
                                                                                                                                                                         
144. OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 18-24. 
145. There was general consensus among those with whom I spoke, and in particular amongst 
those working on property issues, that this set of cases raised a different and far more complex set of 
legal questions that were not commensurate with other civil cases and should be treated separately. 
Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29; Katz Interview, supra note 78; 
see also OMBUDSPERSON FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 10-11. 
146. Since the initial flight of the Albanian population south and then the reverse wave of Serbs 
northward into Serbia proper, there has been additional consolidation of the Serb population into 
enclaves and departures from the area, as well as movements of people from rural areas into the cities 
and the invasion of the international community to occupy much of the downtown space in 
Priština/Prishtinё and other city centers. Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31; Katz Interview, supra 
note 78. 
147. The Housing and Property Directorate is working to determine title as of 1999 and had 
almost finished with the roughly 29,000 disputed claims on residential property as of May 2005. 
Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31.  
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certificates for land sales and other contracts and have not been recording 
changes in land title, but this approach seems likely only to increase the 
potential for confusion and conflicting claims of ownership.148 And in at least 
some cases, properties have been transferred within the Serbian parallel 
systems, causing havoc when the property is brought into the UNMIK 
system.149 
The question of post-conflict disputes over title to land is one that has 
occurred in state after state around the world, and one that is too complex for 
any general civil model to resolve, or for this paper to address in detail.150 The 
codes of most civil law states have some provision for resolving conflicting 
land claims in ordinary times, and these might serve as an effective guideline 
if it emerges that the number of conflicting claims are few and relatively 
simple. 151  If there are many claims and the legal analysis of title is 
complicated by lack of documentation or other problems, then these models 
may be inadequate to the task. The Housing and Property Directorate has 
almost finished determining the title to residential properties as of 1999, and 
this should create a baseline of legal certainty that will simplify the work on 
residential property disputes since that time.152  
One solution would be to require post-1999 re-registry of all land with 
UNMIK offices, to employ a first-in-time default rule to incentivize 
participation, and to litigate any competing claims in the regular courts under 
standard rules of civil litigation. Irrespective of what approach it chooses, 
however, Kosovo would do well to exempt property cases from any 
overarching rule it constructs for recognition of other civil cases, and to turn 
to the models used by other states for addressing post-conflict land claims to 
construct a rule specifically for this issue.153 Here, the balance between the 
problem of legal uncertainty and the risk of fundamental unfairness in any 
given decision tips in the other direction, requiring individual scrutiny of 
property transactions.  
IV. CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS 
Like the Serbian parallel civil cases, the Serbian parallel criminal 
judgments present Kosovo’s courts with a politically loaded version of a 
commonplace legal problem: whether to treat a defendant’s prior conviction 
or acquittal as barring additional prosecutions for the same acts. As in the civil 
cases, the non-recognition of the Serbian parallel criminal judgments also 
presents troubling legal and social consequences ripe for some form of 
intervention. But in the criminal context, much more so than in the civil 
                                                                                                                                                                         
148. Id.; OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 21. 
149. For example, OSCE has reported that in one case, an owner was unable to complete the 
sale of an apartment when an UNMIK court refused to verify the contract of sale because the previous 
purchase contract had been verified by a Serbian parallel court. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, 
supra note 16, at 23. 
150. See generally Jon D. Unruh, Land and Property Rights in the Peace Process (Jan. 2004), 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/Land_tenure/?nid=1387; Lewis, supra note 79.  
151. E.g., C. CIV. arts. 1264-65 (Fr.). 
152. Rosandhaug Interview, supra note 31; Katz Interview, supra note 145. 
153. See Unruh, supra note 150; Lewis, supra note 79, at 6. 
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context, the social and legal incentives for recognizing the Serbian parallel 
courts’ judgments are parried by competing interests that weigh against 
recognition.   
Judgments relating to criminal law touch on one of the hot-button issues 
of the Serbian-Albanian conflict, inter-ethnic violence, and on one of the core 
substantive concerns of post-conflict justice, assigning legal responsibility for 
past atrocities. Thus, the transitional justice concerns raised by the criminal 
cases are far more concrete and immediate than in the civil context, relating to 
the substance of the claims before the court; the fairness of the procedures 
used to decide them; and the satisfaction of Kosovo society with the capacity 
of the courts to address these controversial issues, which in the recent past 
were settled through force. 
To the extent that Serbian parallel civil proceedings can be relied upon 
as essentially fair and non-discriminatory, it is the lack of certainty in the 
enforceability of judgments between the systems and the resulting conflicting 
judgments and arbitrage that have caused injustices. In civil cases, unless and 
until reports of systematic injustice arise, the balance between scrutinizing 
judgments to assure fairness and efficiently recognizing judgments to assure 
legal certainty clearly tips in favor of legal certainty. Recognition of the 
Serbian parallel civil judgments serves as an appropriate and effective 
mechanism for resolving these injustices. 
But in the criminal setting, in addition to the problems raised by mutual 
non-recognition and conflicting judgments, there are reports of ethnic 
discrimination and sham proceedings within the Serbian parallel system. Such 
concerns cannot be resolved by, and would in fact be exacerbated by, 
recognition of the Serbian parallel criminal judgments. In such a context, the 
proper balance between these competing values is more difficult to 
ascertain. 154  The first part of this section reviews two case studies that 
illustrate these concerns. 
In Section IV.B, I consider a further complication presented in the 
criminal setting: here, the balance between conflicting judgments and fairness 
is not entirely a matter of discretion, for it implicates international human 
rights norms, including double jeopardy and other defendants’ rights, as well 
as the rights of victims and the public to see criminal justice done. Therefore, 
the first question that must be asked in the criminal context is not, as it is in 
the civil context, may the Serbian parallel judgments be recognized? Rather, it 
is must the Serbian parallel judgments be recognized or rejected—that is, do 
the human rights of the defendants or the victims compel either universal 
recognition or universal rejection of the Serbian parallel criminal judgments? 
Here, human rights norms compel the rejection of some, but not all, Serbian 
parallel criminal judgments. 
Section IV.C considers the legal models and justifications available for 
recognizing those Serbian parallel criminal judgments whose fate is not 
determined by human rights norms. In the criminal context, the available 
                                                                                                                                                                         
154. It is worth noting, of course, that if this were ultimately found not to be the case—that is, 
if the Serbian parallel system were demonstrated to be systematically unfair in civil cases—the balance 
of interests would shift for the civil cases to be closer to that in the criminal cases. 
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models are far more limited in number and scope than in the civil context. 
Here, there is not a common practice of recognizing non-state judgments like 
the general recognition of arbitration awards and out-of-court settlement 
agreements that provided both a model and a rationale (consent) for 
recognizing the civil Serbian parallel judgments. Indeed, such recognition is 
typically impermissible. Even within the limited context of criminal 
judgments by the courts of sovereign foreign states, there is not broad 
international consensus favoring recognition of such judgments, nor is there 
agreement on the default rules. Rather, such recognition is rare, existing 
primarily in the context of efforts to create a common legal system, and the 
default rules and exceptions for such recognition vary tremendously. The rules 
for recognition are also less well elaborated than in the civil context, 
depending instead more on exercise of discretion and comity than on codified 
factors. 
These limited legal models will not permit Kosovo to bypass the 
political problem of sovereignty, nor can they adequately address the tension 
between resolving the problems posed by conflicting judgments and the 
problems posed by essential fairness concerns. Accordingly, I conclude that, 
in spite of the resultant loss of legal certainty and the human cost to 
defendants, Kosovo should address its Serbian parallel criminal judgments on 
a case-by-case basis, and through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
rather than formal recognition. Kosovo’s provisional criminal procedure and 
criminal codes provide mechanisms that can facilitate such case-by-case 
analysis, and these are discussed in Section IV.D. 
A. Two Criminal Cases 
As in the civil context, neither the Serbian parallel courts nor the 
UNMIK courts recognize each other’s criminal judgments. Rather, if faced 
with a defendant who has already been tried by the other tribunal, both courts 
will pursue their own prosecutions without regard to the determinations of the 
other system. The one concession frequently made by UNMIK courts is to 
give credit in sentencing a convicted defendant for time served in the Serbian 
parallel system, whether in pre-trial detention or after sentencing, but this is 
not a formal policy, merely a common practice.155 
Two cases present paradigmatic examples of the interests at stake.156 
Judge Baruti, the President of the District Court of Mitrovicё/Mitrovica (an 
UNMIK court), described a case that illustrates the cost the parallel systems 
impose on defendants. A Serb defendant was suspected of a murder in 
                                                                                                                                                                         
155. Baruti Interview, supra note 31. 
156. As in the civil context, see supra note 90 and accompanying text, official reports on the 
parallel courts also describe criminal cases raising these issues.   E.g., OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES 
REPORT, supra note 16, at 20 (describing two cases in which defendants were tried for the same acts in 
both UNMIK and Serbian parallel courts).  The OSCE also reported that the presidents of two Serbian 
parallel courts informed it that they had caseloads of hundreds of criminal cases between 1999 and July 
2003.  Id. at 19-20.  However, once again, due to the mutual non-recognition between the systems that 
has produced the problems discussed in this article, neither official judgments and other individual case 
records nor statistical or other general data are available for the Serbian parallel courts criminal cases, so 
that it is not possible to ascertain the number or nature of the overlapping and/or conflicting cases.    
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Mitrovicё/Mitrovica. He traveled into Serbia proper, where he was arrested by 
the Serbian police and brought before the Serbian parallel district court for 
Mitrovicё/Mitrovica, which is located in the Serbian city of Kraljevo. He was 
detained there, tried, and acquitted. Thinking that double jeopardy would 
prevent his retrial in Kosovo, the defendant returned to Mitrovicё/Mitrovica, 
where a warrant for his arrest was pending. He was promptly arrested, held 
again in custody, tried, and acquitted again, whereupon he filed a claim for 
compensation from UNMIK for the period of his detention.157   
Here, what Judge Baruti described as the “human cost” of the 
defendant’s dual detentions is obvious. But in Kosovo, these multiple 
prosecutions are understood to affect not only this human cost, but also the 
defendant’s legal right to be free from double jeopardy. To American readers 
accustomed to the dual sovereignty exception to the double jeopardy principle 
and to the possibility of multiple prosecutions in state and federal courts that 
this exception permits, this may not seem like a legitimate concern. Here, it is 
important to note that some European states do not recognize the dual 
sovereignty principle, but rather, regard a prosecution in any recognized court 
as barring further prosecutions for the same acts in any other recognized court 
on the basis of the principle of ne bis in idem, a principle that is similar but not 
identical to the American concept of double jeopardy. Also, in the United 
States the otherwise stark dual sovereignty rule is substantially mitigated by 
the principle of comity so that repeated prosecutions are in fact rare; such an 
approach of course cannot be expected between the Serbian parallel and 
UNMIK courts.158 
But there are other concerns as well, and these are illustrated by a 
second case. A Kosovo Serb was accused of shooting an unarmed, elderly 
Kosovo Albanian man who had been merely standing silently as the defendant 
passed by. The defendant’s act was spurred, it was reported, by the sudden 
fear that the Albanian man would seize his gun. The UNMIK Prosecutor 
issued an indictment for murder, but the defendant fled to Serbia proper, 
where he was arrested, tried for murder by a Serbian parallel court, and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
157. Baruti Interview, supra note 31.  The OSCE describes what may be the same case, and is 
at a minimum a case with very similar facts, in a 2002 report.  OSCE NINTH MINORITY ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 36, at 17.  Kosovo’s Criminal Procedure Code provides a cause of action for damages for 
unjustified convictions and deprivations of liberty. U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Provisional Criminal 
Procedure Code of Kosovo, arts. 534, 538, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2003/26 (July 6, 2003), available at 
http://www.unmikonlin.org/regulations/2003/KE2003-26.pdf [hereinafter Provisional Criminal 
Procedure Code of Kosovo).  Reversals of this scenario also occur, with a Serbian parallel court trial 
following a prior UNMIK conviction or acquittal. OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 
16, at 20. 
158. See infra Subsection IV.C.1. Generalizing broadly, in the American view, the touchstone 
of double jeopardy is whether the legal grounds for prosecution are different, and multiple prosecutions 
for the same act are readily tolerated, so long as the charges brought do not encompass the prior charges. 
In the European view, the core ne bis in idem protection is against multiple prosecutions for the same 
act, regardless of how the act is charged.  In addition, U.S. courts apply the dual sovereignty principle to 
permit second trials even on the same legal grounds so long as the trial takes place under a different 
sovereign. In Europe, some states apply ne bis in idem across international borders, whereas many, 
while recognizing the sweeping nature of the principle, view it as the basis for negotiating bilateral 
agreements not to reprosecute and do not apply it automatically in the absence of such agreements. Dax 
Eric Lopez, Note, Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine is Used to Circumvent 
Non Bis in Idem, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1263, 1271-73, 1282-84 (2000); see also infra Section 
IV.B. 
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convicted. But the sentence he received for his crime was a single year in 
prison, a sentence so light as to raise concern about the good faith of the 
proceedings. The indictment in Kosovo has never been carried out.159   
Serbian parallel cases involving accusations of war crimes or inter-
ethnic violence present a particularly acute dilemma for UNMIK, for such 
cases both illustrate and catalyze the continuing ethnic tensions and security 
problems in the province.160 As suggested by this second example, the trial 
and sentencing practices of the Serbian parallel courts have raised suspicions 
of partiality and sham prosecutions intended to shield defendants rather than 
to assess their guilt or innocence. Therefore, in addition to the rights of 
defendants, criminal trials in Serbian parallel courts implicate the interests of 
both the public and victims in justice and social stability. 
B. International Human Rights Norms 
In Kosovo today, international human rights norms have been imported 
into the national legal structure by the Constitutional Framework for 
Provisional Self-Government, which provides that eight international human 
rights treaties are directly applicable in Kosovo, including two of relevance 
here: the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols (“European Convention”) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Protocols 
(“ICCPR”).161 Kosovo’s Provisional Criminal Procedure Code also directly 
protects certain human rights.162 
Parallel criminal prosecutions implicate two well-established 
defendants’ rights. On the one hand, the right to be free from double jeopardy 
or ne bis in idem (which corresponds roughly to the interest in avoiding 
conflicting judgments and assuring legal certainty described in the civil 
context)163 might require that UNMIK refrain from trying defendants who 
have already faced prosecution in the parallel courts, or that it object 
strenuously to retrial in the parallel courts of defendants it has already 
prosecuted. On the other hand, the right to trial before an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law (corresponding in turn to the fairness 
value discussed above) might require UNMIK to reject the parallel court 
judgments out of hand.   
Of these two rights, Kosovo’s international institutions have analyzed 
the problem of the Serbian parallel criminal judgments almost exclusively as a 
                                                                                                                                                                         
159. First Interview with Anonymous #11, supra note 93. 
160. A number of defendants who have been indicted by UNMIK on serious charges ranging 
from attempted murder to genocide have reportedly fled to Serbia proper. Id. 
161. See Constitutional Framework, supra note 41, arts. 3.2, 9; European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 
[hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights arts. 9, 14, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR] (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
162. Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157.  Before 2003, the 
applicable criminal procedure code in Kosovo was that of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. 
163. “The principle of finality of criminal proceedings also underlies the principle of ne bis in 
idem.” Case C-467/04, Gasparini and Others, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 295, para. 72 n.57 (June 15, 
2006).  
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problem of double jeopardy.164 In so doing, they seem to assume that the 
principle necessarily applies to duplicate prosecutions by UNMIK and Serbian 
parallel courts.165 But in fact, ne bis in idem does not bar these prosecutions. 
On a theoretical level, the principle of ne bis in idem should ideally be applied 
to multiple prosecutions for the same act regardless of the courts or charges 
involved. But in reality, the international legal obligation is more limited. As 
defined by the relevant human rights treaties, ne bis in idem applies only to 
multiple prosecutions by the same sovereign. The European Convention, for 
example, refers to the right not to be tried again “under the jurisdiction of the 
same State,”166 while the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
forbids re-prosecution after final judgment in “each country.”167   
Within Kosovo, the language of the Provisional Criminal Procedure 
Code is ambiguous on the question of whether ne bis in idem applies only to 
cases tried in the recognized Kosovo courts or to cases tried in foreign courts 
as well.168 However, the Provisional Criminal Code permits retrial in Kosovo 
after foreign prosecutions in some instances, indicating that ne bis in idem 
protection may not be considered to apply to those judgments. 169  
Furthermore, even if the principle of ne bis in idem were applicable, this 
would not prevent Kosovo from trying defendants whom it believed had been 
subject to sham or biased prosecutions in the Serbian parallel system. There 
are well-established exceptions in international human rights law to permit 
either reopening of a case (in the traditional context of multiple prosecutions 
within a state) or the instigation of a new case in a different state (in the 
context of extension of the principle to prosecutions by multiple sovereigns) 
for new evidence, for lack of due process, or in the case of sham 
proceedings.170   
                                                                                                                                                                         
164. See OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 20; OSCE TENTH MINORITY 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 33. 
165. See OSCE PARALLEL STRUCTURES REPORT, supra note 16, at 5, 20. 
166. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 161, Protocol No. 7, ¶ 4(1). 
167. ICCPR, supra note 161, art. 14(7). 
168. Kosovo’s Criminal Procedure Code forbids re-prosecution if a defendant “has been 
acquitted or convicted of a criminal offense by a final decision of a court, if criminal proceedings 
against him or her were terminated by a final decision of a court or if the indictment against him or her 
was dismissed by a final decision of a court.” Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra 
note 157, art. 4(1) (emphasis added).  The code does not define whether the term “court” refers solely to 
the courts of Kosovo or also to foreign courts. It does use the terms “a court,” “the courts,” and “courts” 
throughout when plainly referring solely the enumerated courts of Kosovo and not to foreign courts or 
other tribunals. Adding to the ambiguity, Article 4’s reference to “a court” is surrounded by variations 
on the phrase, seemingly without any meaningful difference: All appear to refer solely to the Kosovo 
courts.  See, e.g., id. art. 1 (“the regular courts”), art. 2 (“a court”), art. 3 (“the court”), art. 5 (“the 
court”). The criminal procedure code of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, which was effective in 
Kosovo previously, is similarly non-specific, reading in relevant part: “if the defendant has already been 
effectively convicted of the same criminal act or acquitted of the charge . . . .” CRIM. P.C. art. 349(5) 
(Yugo.) (on file with author).  
169. U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, arts. 99-104, U.N. Doc. 
UNMIK/REG/2003/25 (July 6, 2003), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2003/ 
RE2003-25.pdf [hereinafter Criminal Code of Kosovo]. 
170. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 161, Protocol No. 7, art. 4(2); 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 20(3), July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 183/9 
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 13: Equality Before 
the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an Independent Court Established by Law, art. 
14, ¶ 19 (1984), reprinted in International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 14, U.N. Doc. 
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From UNMIK’s perspective, what ought to be of more concern is the 
international human rights protection of trial before a properly constituted 
tribunal. The European Convention requires that a person be detained only 
upon conviction or order of a “competent court,” and that a defendant has the 
right to be “brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law 
to exercise judicial power” to determine the lawfulness of his detention.171 
The defendant is then entitled to trial “by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.”172 The requirements of the ICCPR and Kosovo’s 
Provisional Criminal Procedure Code are essentially the same.173   
Under these standards, there are two aspects of this right that are at issue 
in Serbian parallel cases like those discussed above: whether the tribunal is 
independent and impartial, and whether the defendant is tried before a 
competent court with legal authority to hear the case. As to the first question, 
as illustrated by the cases described above, there is some reason to doubt the 
independence and impartiality of the Serbian courts, at least in inter-ethnic 
cases. Such concerns are generally grounded in the region’s history of inter-
ethnic discrimination and violence—the very reason that the Security Council 
barred Serbia from governing the province itself.174   
In relation to this question, it is also important to note that removing all 
criminal cases to the UNMIK system would not guarantee an impartial 
tribunal, at least not under the present operating conditions in the UNMIK 
courts. Indeed, several members of the legal community reported that UNMIK 
judges are under enormous pressure to convict Serb defendants accused of 
crimes against Albanians and that this pressure has taken the form not merely 
of social approval or disapproval but of threats of violence.175 It has also been 
suggested that there is considerable pressure within the Albanian community 
to testify against Serbs accused of war crimes and inter-ethnic violence 
irrespective of the witness’s actual knowledge of the matter, rendering witness 
testimony highly problematic as a form of evidence.176 In counterpoint, the 
international judges and prosecutors are perceived by the Albanian 
                                                                                                                                                                         
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (July 24, 1994); Legislative Resolution 7246/2003, Application of the “Ne Bis in 
Idem” Principle, amend. 13, art. 2, para. 2, 2004 O.J. (C 76) 86, 91 (Eur. Parl.), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/ce076/ce07620040325en00860094.pdf 
[hereinafter European Parliament Legislative Resolution]. There are also other exceptions under which 
the trial is not considered to have resulted in final judgment, such as retrials following successful 
appeals and, in the American system, mistrials or retrials on substantively different charges. See Albin 
Eser, For Universal Jurisdiction, 39 TULSA L. REV. 955, 967-68 (2004). 
171. European Convention, supra note 161, art. 5. 
172. Id. art. 6.  
173. Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, arts. 2, 20; ICCPR, 
supra note 161, art. 9(3). 
174. Pantovic Interview, supra note 31; see also discussion, supra Section I.A. Recognition of 
the Serbian parallel court judgments could also violate other defendants’ rights—for example, the 
presumption of innocence. Under Kosovo’s Provisional Criminal Procedure Code and the applicable 
human rights treaties, as in most criminal justice systems, “[a]ny person . . . charged with a criminal 
offense shall be deemed innocent until his or her guilt has been established by a final judgment of the 
court.” Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, art. 3(1); ICCPR, supra note 161; 
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 161. However, this concern is subject to the same 
limitations as the other rights discussed above.  
175. Baruti Interview, supra note 31; Pantovic Interview, supra note 31. 
176. Pantovic Interview, supra note 31. 
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community as bending over backwards to accommodate Serbs and other 
minorities in the name of ethnic harmony and minority rights.177 
As for the second question, of course, which legal system is authorized 
and which law governs in Kosovo are precisely the political issues at stake. 
But setting aside the ultimate determination of this question, according to 
UNMIK’s own understanding of the governing law, one must conclude that 
the rights of defendants under UNMIK’s jurisdiction to be tried in a 
competent tribunal established by law are violated by trial in the unauthorized 
Serbian parallel court system.178  
This conclusion foreshadows the findings in the next Section: that in the 
criminal context, sovereignty—or at least authority delegated by a 
sovereign—is the sole source of legitimacy, and it is impossible to circumvent 
the sovereignty question as can be done in the civil context. However, it is 
also important to note that while defendants’ rights may have been violated by 
trial in the Serbian parallel court system, and while this may serve as at least 
formal grounds for non-recognition of such judgments, such a result could not 
be characterized as a remedy for the violation. After all, these standards are 
intended to protect defendants by limiting state power to detain and punish.179 
International human rights norms might require Kosovo to respond to a 
defendant’s objection to Serbian parallel court jurisdiction on these grounds, 
to refuse to participate in a prosecution in the parallel courts, to seek 
compensation for a defendant wrongfully tried, and even to refuse to 
recognize a criminal judgment, but subsequent retrial of a defendant would 
have to be justified on some other grounds than protection of the defendants’ 
rights. 
C. Frameworks for Recognition and Non-Recognition 
The relevant models for recognition and enforcement of foreign criminal 
judgments to bar domestic prosecution include: the Schengen acquis, which 
contains an agreement applicable to certain European Union member states to 
extend the principle of ne bis in idem between them;180  a proposed E.U. 
Council Framework Decision to the same effect;181 and the U.S. common law 
                                                                                                                                                                         
177. Thomas & Marzatico Interview, supra note 35; Vokshi Interview, supra note 29. 
178. Security Council Resolution 1244 authorizes the international community to set up 
temporary administration leading to self-government for Kosovo.  S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 2, ¶¶ 10-
11.  The Constitutional Framework for Kosovo establishes a judiciary with sole jurisdiction over the 
province that does not provide any basis for Serbian parallel court jurisdiction.  Constitutional 
Framework, supra note 41, art. 9.4. The Serbian parallel courts apply laws and follow procedures that 
are no longer the laws and procedures in force in Kosovo.  Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra 
note 168, art. 2. Of course, one would expect Serbia to draw the same conclusion concerning the 
UNMIK courts.  
179. This is, of course, the “main rationale” of the ne bis in idem principle as well. Case C-
467/04, Gasparini and Others, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 295, para. 72 n.57 (June 15, 2006). 
180. The Schengen acquis comprises the Agreement between the Governments of the States of 
the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the French Republic on the 
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, signed at Schengen on 14 June 1985, and the 
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement. Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19 [hereinafter Schengen Agreement Convention].  See 
Gasparini, paras. 4-5. 
181. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 170. 
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rule, which represents the usual default rule to treat foreign criminal 
judgments as having no effect on additional domestic prosecutions on the 
same grounds.182 In contrast to the civil law context, where Kosovo relies on 
the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia law, Kosovo has a new 
Provisional Criminal Code and Provisional Criminal Procedure Code as of 
2003. 183  Here, the available legal models do not provide a basis for a 
sweeping decision implicating all Serbian parallel court judgments, but rather 
leave Kosovo with no better option than a case-by-case approach. 
1. Sovereignty 
In the criminal context, the available legal models do not present a 
means of bypassing the issue of sovereignty, as they do in the civil context. To 
the contrary, recognition of criminal judgments is predicated on an exercise of 
state authority, and consent plays no role in most cases. The U.S. case law on 
point refers consistently to “sovereigns” and “sovereign governments.” 184 
Kosovo’s Provisional Criminal Code permits recognition only of the criminal 
judgments of foreign states’ courts, while the Schengen acquis and the 
proposed E.C. Framework Decision further limit recognition to contracting or 
member states respectively. 185  While Kosovo’s Provisional Criminal 
Procedure Code permits private prosecutions and minor cases to be mediated, 
the public prosecutor, and thus ultimately the state, must acquiesce in the 
decision to mediate the case and approve the mediator, unlike the civil context 
in which the parties can take the case to mediation at will.186   
 2. Default Rules and Grounds for Non-Recognition 
In the criminal context, as in the civil context, most states employ a 
default rule against recognition of other jurisdictions’ criminal judgments, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
182. See, e.g., United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concerning 
successive foreign-federal prosecutions: “The [double jeopardy] clause forecloses multiple prosecutions 
for the same offense by the same sovereign, but not ones by different sovereigns”); United States v. 
Guzman, 85 F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1996) (concerning successive foreign-federal prosecutions: “The 
black-letter rule is that prosecutions undertaken by separate sovereign governments, no matter how 
similar they may be in character, do not raise the specter of double jeopardy”); Chua Han Mow v. 
United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985) (concerning 
successive foreign-federal prosecutions: “‘prosecution by a foreign sovereign does not preclude the 
United States from bringing criminal charges’” (quoting United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 46 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (per curiam))), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979)); see also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 
377, 382-85 (1922) (applying the dual sovereignty rule to successive state-federal prosecutions).   
183. Provisional Criminal Code, supra note 169, arts. 99-103; see also Provisional Criminal 
Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, arts. 509-11. 
184. See, e.g., Rashed, 234 F.3d at 1282 (“different sovereigns”); Guzman, 85 F.3d at 826 
(“sovereign governments”); Chua Han Mow, 730 F.2d at 1313 (“a foreign sovereign”); Lanza, 260 U.S. 
at 382 (“two sovereignties”).   
185. The Kosovo Provisional Criminal Code refers alternately to “another jurisdiction,” “a 
foreign jurisdiction,” and “a foreign court.” Provisional Criminal Code, supra note 1698, arts. 103-04; 
see also Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 6, art. 509(1); Schengen 
Agreement Convention, supra note 178, art. 54; European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 
170. 
186. The prosecutor must take into account the nature of the crime, the circumstances, and the 
defendant’s criminal record and level of culpability. Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, 
supra note 156, arts. 54(3), 228.  
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unless there is an agreement or law to the contrary. Specifically, without an 
agreement on the subject, most states do not view criminal prosecutions by 
one state as barring an additional prosecution on the same facts by a second 
state with jurisdiction over the matter. As discussed above, international 
human rights law does not require that they do so. Rather, without some 
agreement in place, states typically refrain from such prosecutions solely as a 
matter of comity, and most do not regard the foreign prosecution as presenting 
a legal barrier.187  
But unlike the civil context, where agreements and laws to facilitate the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments are proliferating, there are still few 
agreements and laws recognizing and enforcing criminal judgments against 
the possibility of future prosecutions.188 In Europe, the Schengen acquis, as 
integrated into the E.U. framework, provides for automatic recognition of 
criminal judgments of the courts of its member states and prohibits retrials on 
the same facts amongst thirteen of the E.U. member states.189 The European 
Union is now moving toward a similar E.U.-wide model as part of its efforts 
to create a single regional jurisdiction in Europe, but efforts at harmonization 
and developing common E.U. mechanisms have been contested and 
controversial. 190  Moreover, there do not exist in the criminal context the 
widely ratified agreements that govern enforcement in the context of civil and 
commercial judgments and represent collective international agreement on the 
importance and mechanism of recognizing such judgments. In the criminal 
                                                                                                                                                                         
187. Some states, such as Germany, do give credit for time served at sentencing, applying a 
“deduction principle.” There are also a few states like the Netherlands that automatically recognize most 
foreign criminal judgments, applying the broadest understanding of the ne bis in idem principle. Eser, 
supra note 170, at 964.  It is also important to note that within the United States, in the context of 
successive federal-state prosecutions, comity is really more the rule than the exception.  The federal 
government has adopted internal guidelines known as the “Petite Policy” disfavoring federal 
prosecutions following a U.S. state prosecution “unless reasons are compelling.” ADAM HARRIS 
CURLAND, SUCCESSIVE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS  3 (2001).  While policies amongst the U.S. states vary, 
a number of states also frequently refrain from reprosecuting following a sister state’s judgment, often 
under the auspices of a state statute.  Id. at 45-46. 
188. Rather, most agreements and laws recognizing foreign criminal judgments are for the 
limited purposes of extradition, cooperation, or designation of a foreign national as having a criminal 
record. E.g., CODE PÉNALE art. 768 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/ 
cpptextA.htm. Such provisions do not bar states from prosecuting a defendant altogether, even if he has 
already been charged and prosecuted for the same crime in another state, so long as the defendant enters 
the court’s jurisdiction without the need for extradition. E.g., Extradition Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the United Mexican States, U.S.-Mex., art. 6, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5061 
(barring extradition).  Within the United States, Mississippi is unusual in having enacted a statute of 
general applicability barring state prosecution after a foreign “conviction or acquittal for the same 
offense.” MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-11-27 (1972); CURLAND, supra note 188, at 185. 
189. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 170, amend. 2, recital 2a (new); 
Schengen Agreement Convention, supra note 180, art. 54. See also Case C-467/04, Gasparini and 
Others, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 295 (June 15, 2006); Joined Cases C-187/01 & C-385/01, Gözütok, 
Brügge, 2003 E.C.R. I-1345, 2003 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 386 (Feb. 11, 2003); Case C-469/03, Miraglia, 
2005 E.C.R. I-2009, 2005 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 80 (Mar. 10, 2005); Case C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, 2006 
E.C.R. I-2333, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 576 (Mar. 9, 2006); Case C-150/05, Van Straaten, 2006 ECJ 
CELEX LEXIS 541 (Sept. 28, 2006).  
190. See European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 170. Case C-303/05, 
Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, 2006 WL 2612698, ¶¶ 1-8 (Sept. 12, 
2006) (concerning “a far-reaching debate concerning the risk of incompatibility between the 
constitutions of the Member States and European Union law” over the new European arrest warrant, 
raised in the constitutional courts in Belgium, Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic, as well as the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus). 
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context, there is considerably less convergence than in the civil context, and 
the models that exist are far less robust. 
 
Table 4: Default Recognition Rules and Grounds for Non-Enforcement 






Default Rule Contracting Party states 
must refrain from 
prosecuting a defendant 
for the same acts after 
final disposition in 
another Contracting 
Party191 
Member States must 
refrain from prosecuting 
a defendant for the same 
acts, facts or behavior 
after a final criminal 




judgments do not 
bar prosecutions 
in U.S. courts193 
Depends on the basis for 
Kosovo’s juris.   
1. If territorial: foreign 
judgments do not bar 
prosecutions in K. courts 
2. If another basis: K. must 
refrain from prosecuting a 
def. following final foreign 








1. If convicted, failure 
to enforce a penalty 
2. State party’s prior 
declaration of certain 
exceptions concerning 
its: 





c. official acts of state 
officials195 
1. If convicted, failure 
to enforce a penalty 
2. Post-judgment proof 
of new facts not 
reasonably discoverable 
by prosecutors at time 
of trial 
3. Fundamental 
procedural error under 
original state’s law 
4. Violation of 
defendant’s rights196  
N/A 1. If territorial juris.: Public 
Prosecutor’s discretion197 
2. Any case can be reopened 
against a def. for fraudulent 
evidence or a 
judge/investigator’s criminal 
act198 
3. Any case can be reopened 
to benefit a def. on the same 
basis or: 
a. Favorable new evidence  
b. Def. was tried repeatedly 
c. Multiple people were 
convicted of an act only one 
or some could have 
committed199 
 
Whereas in the civil context, a generous default rule is moderated by 
carefully crafted grounds for non-enforcement whose substance and procedure 
is calibrated to the level of confidence in and concern with the fairness of the 
alternative tribunal’s process, in the criminal context, there is a sharp 
divergence between the Schengen and proposed European Union default rules 
favoring recognition and the U.S. common law rule disfavoring recognition. 
There is also little convergence in or certainty concerning the appropriate 
grounds for non-enforcement. Rather than centering the non-enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                                         
191. Schengen Agreement Convention, supra note 178, art. 54.  
192. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 168, amend. 12, art. 2, para. 1.  
193. United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Guzman, 
85 F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1996); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984); 
see also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382-85 (1922).   
194. Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra note 169, arts. 103-04 (also listing additional minor 
grounds); see also Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, art. 511 (enforcing foreign 
criminal judgments when Kosovo lacks jurisdiction). 
195. Schengen Agreement Convention, supra note 176, at 55. 
196. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 166, amend. 7, recital 7(b) & 
amend. 12, art. 2, para. 1. 
197. Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra note 169, arts. 103(1), 103(5); Provisional 
Criminal Procedural Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, art. 511. 
198. This rule applies to reopening both domestic and foreign judgments. The fraud or crime 
must be proved by a final judgment or, in special circumstances, by other evidence. Id. art. 442. 
199. This rule also applies to both domestic and foreign judgments. Id. 
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decision in a set of legal factors that can be considered after a request to 
enforce is presented, instead, states that do not choose to enforce foreign legal 
decisions tend to make that choice as a matter of discretion or comity at the 
outset. Furthermore, none of the grounds recognized in other states would 
permit Kosovo to grapple with its core concern: the risk of procedurally 
correct but nonetheless substantively sham proceedings. 200  Indeed, the 
standards established for recognition in the European examples “presuppose[] 
confidence in the fact that judgments recognised are always delivered in 
accordance with the principles of legality, subsidiarity and proportionality.”201  
Kosovo itself straddles the different models. The underlying rationale 
for its contrasting default rules appears to be a judgment that it is important 
for Kosovo to prosecute crimes committed within its own borders. This 
principle, of course, precludes recognition of the Serbian parallel court 
judgments. If Kosovo were nonetheless to adopt a default rule accepting 
Serbian parallel court criminal judgments, its provisions on reopening cases 
would provide some rationale for reopening cases involving fraud or criminal 
misbehavior within the proceedings. However, this provision sets a high 
evidentiary standard for reopening cases, requiring a final judgment of fraud 
or crime in most cases. As a result, this might not be sufficient to permit 
reopening of cases like the one described in Section IV.A above, in which an 
extremely light sentence gives rise to suspicions of discrimination and sham 
proceedings, but in which there is not necessarily evidence of such conduct 
available.202 
Furthermore, while in the civil context the consent of the parties 
provided some rationale for tolerating differences in process and result from 
what might have existed if the case had been brought before the UNMIK 
courts, there is no principle that can do similar work here. The civil models 
also provided for consideration of a more generous set of concerns in at least 
some instances. Because they will not permit Kosovo to recognize the 
criminal judgments without acknowledging sovereignty, and because they do 
not provide factors effective for grappling with the core concern about the 
Serbian parallel courts’ exercise of authority over criminal cases, these models 
do not provide a template for establishing a default rule favoring general 
recognition of Serbian parallel criminal judgments.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
200. The International Criminal Court rules on complementarity do permit the ICC to prosecute 
if a domestic proceeding was a sham, but do not provide rules or factors for determining this.  See Rome 
Statute, supra note 166, art. 20(3). 
201. European Parliament Legislative Resolution, supra note 166, amend. 4, recital 5 
(superseded by amendment) (emphasis omitted); see also Joined Cases C-187/01 & C-385/01, Gözütok, 
Brügge, 2003 E.C.R. I-1345, ¶ 33, 2003 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 386 (Feb. 11, 2003) (when the ne bis in 
idem principle is applied, “there is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in 
their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other 
Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were applied”). 
202. Compare Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, supra note 168, arts. 99-104 (establishing 
criminal jurisdiction of Kosovo courts, conditions for prosecution where criminal proceedings have been 
initiated in another jurisdiction, and calculation of detention and punishment served in other 
jurisdictions), with Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, supra note 157, art. 442 
(enumerating conditions under which a final criminal judgment can be reopened). 
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3. A Criminal Judgment Model: Case by Case Assessments 
Finally, in the criminal context, not only are the legal models for 
recognition of judgments limited and linked to sovereignty, the transitional 
justice imperatives that push for recognition of judgments in the civil context 
cut in the opposite direction. Because some criminal judgments—particularly 
those relating to inter-ethnic violence—are so closely linked in the public 
view to the core of the conflict itself, the public perception that the judicial 
system can and will punish violence, and particularly inter-ethnic violence, is 
crucial to the future stability and security of Kosovo.203 The very reason for 
U.N. intervention in Kosovo was the ethnic bias that pervaded the government 
and social institutions and that ultimately culminated in violent ethnic 
cleansing. Likewise, the purpose of continued U.N. involvement is the 
establishment of a democratic, multi-ethnic government capable of ensuring 
security and justice. 204  In recent months, as negotiations over Kosovo’s 
political status have begun, bombings and other attacks, both inter-ethnic and 
intra-Albanian, have been frequent.205  
 Furthermore, under the law applicable in Kosovo today, prosecutors 
may have an obligation to bring charges in at least some of the cases already 
tried by the Serbian parallel courts, particularly if they have reason to believe 
the proceedings in the parallel case may have been discriminatory. The 
relevant human rights treaties guarantee rights to protection against intrusions 
on life, liberty, and other attack; to equality before the law; and to 
nondiscrimination.206 Indeed, Kosovo’s Provisional Criminal Procedure Code 
specifically requires the prosecutor to prosecute where there are reasonable 
grounds to think that a crime has been committed. Her discretion to choose 
not to prosecute or to divert a case to mediation is limited to minor crimes.207 
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted a crime 
victim’s right of access to justice to require states to prosecute crimes that rise 
to the level of violating the victim’s human rights, such as the right to life.208  
Of course, not all cases tried in the Serbian parallel courts will implicate 
these concerns. Many crimes are minor or intra-ethnic in nature. Particularly 
in cases involving members of the same ethnic community and tried in the 
Serbian parallel courts within Kosovo, victims may well have had the 
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opportunity to participate in the proceedings. As far as ethnic discrimination is 
concerned, not even all inter-ethnic cases will raise discrimination concerns, 
and it is unlikely that many of the Serbian parallel courts’ criminal cases are 
inter-ethnic, in light of the small number of non-Albanians remaining in 
Kosovo and the limited interactions between the ethnic communities.   
However, although at least some of the Serbian parallel criminal 
judgments present appealing cases for recognition, the available legal models 
and justifications do not provide a mechanism for general recognition of the 
criminal judgments as they do in the civil context. In the criminal context, 
there is no legal framework that permits circumvention of sovereignty. The 
transitional justice values of ensuring criminal justice, consolidating 
sovereignty, and establishing security are all so strongly implicated by control 
over the criminal process that they must trump the interests in efficiency and 
legal certainty that prevail in the civil context. To protect these rights and 
interests, Kosovo must either undertake a case-by-case analysis to cull those 
cases that raise human rights concerns from those that do not, or refuse to 
recognize the Serbian parallel criminal judgments altogether, thereby rejecting 
some judgments that do not raise human rights concerns along with those that 
do.   
However, just as recognizing civil judgments generally does not mean 
ceding all discretion to deny recognition in cases where there are grounds for 
such a decision, so also refusing to recognize Serbian parallel criminal 
judgments in general does not mean that every case heard in the Serbian 
parallel courts must be retried. First, since the Serbian parallel courts in the 
enclaves have stopped hearing criminal cases and the parallel courts within 
Serbia hear (if any) only a few, there should be very few recent criminal cases 
at issue and few (if any) new cases forthcoming. For minor crimes, statutes of 
limitations may have run, precluding reconsideration of those cases.  
Also, Kosovo’s Criminal Procedure Code provides multiple mechanisms 
for, if not officially recognizing Serbian parallel criminal judgments, at least 
permitting them to stand without initiating new proceedings, on a case-by-
case basis. Kosovo’s provisional criminal code permits mediation of minor 
crimes, and so in qualifying cases, the prosecutor could treat the Serbian 
parallel court judgment as the equivalent of a mediation decision. The 
Provisional Criminal Procedure Code provides guidelines for prosecutors to 
consider in making such referrals and also requires the consent of both the 
defendant and the victim.209 In cases meeting the guidelines, prosecutors could 
employ either an opt-in or opt-out approach to consent, either proactively 
contacting victims and defendants to request consent, or informing the public 
at large of the need to opt out of minor Serbian parallel criminal judgments if 
they wish the public prosecutor to pursue such cases and implying consent if 
the parties do not opt out within a certain period of time.  
In more serious cases with Serbian parallel guilty verdicts, prosecutors 
could use the established principle of giving credit for time served for the 
same act to make a principled decision not to prosecute someone who has 
been convicted in a fair process in the Serbian parallel system and has already 
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served a sentence commensurate with that available under Kosovo law.210 
After all, in such cases, even if reprosecuted, the defendant should not be 
subject to additional punishment under the provisions of Kosovo’s provisional 
criminal and criminal procedure codes. Similarly, rather than directly 
recognizing just acquittals in the Serbian parallel system, prosecutors could 
determine not to bring charges on the basis of the same lack of evidence that 
led to the original, parallel acquittal. Any such determinations could be made 
by recourse to the ordinary procedures of the Kosovo legal system.   
While each of these mechanisms would require review of individual 
cases within the prosecutors’ offices, they would present a principled way of 
mitigating the human cost to defendants of repeated prosecutions without 
conceding the jurisdiction of the Serbian parallel courts or undermining the 
fundamental demands of justice for victims and for the state. The real risk of a 
case-by-case review is that this mechanism will likely not prove to be 
comprehensive. Reviewing all the cases tried in the Serbian parallel system 
would require the cooperation of the Serbian parallel courts themselves for 
access to case files, and this is not likely to be forthcoming, at least in the 
current political climate. Such review also represents a burden that the 
UNMIK system may not be equipped to handle. Under these circumstances, it 
would be wise for the prosecutor’s office to begin with a review of those cases 
that present potential violations of the public and victims’ interest in justice 
and other similarly serious failures of justice, using the international human 
rights treaties and the domestic grounds for reopening final judgments as 
guidelines for the circumstances that qualify as such. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Under ordinary principles of conflict of laws and with the aims of 
transitional justice in mind, the systematic recognition of most Serbian 
parallel civil court judgments in Kosovo is both desirable and legally feasible. 
In contrast, there are crucial differences between the Serbian parallel civil and 
criminal judgments that weigh against sweeping recognition of the decisions 
in criminal cases. In Kosovo’s post-conflict context, the criminal judgments 
implicate core questions of inter-ethnic justice, and recognizing them 
wholesale would run the risk of legitimizing the very sort of inter-ethnic 
discrimination and violence that is at the heart of the conflict. In contrast, the 
injustices wrought by the Serbian parallel civil judgments seem to be 
primarily the consequences of the very existence of dual, hostile systems—
conflicting judgments and legal uncertainty—and therefore can be resolved 
through systematic recognition of those judgments. 
Furthermore, while the available legal models in the civil system enable 
the recognition of Serbian parallel judgments without simultaneously 
recognizing sovereignty or jurisdiction, those in the criminal system do not. 
Rather, recognition of foreign criminal judgments depends expressly on state 
authority for the legitimacy of the original judgment. Accordingly, any 
decision to recognize Serbian parallel criminal judgments through this model 
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would have to follow a political decision concerning sovereignty and 
jurisdiction, rather than rendering such a decision unnecessary.   
In addition, while the relevant civil judgment models have converged on 
determinative factors for recognition that are useful and appropriate for 
assessing Serbian parallel court judgments, this is not true for criminal cases. 
Many of the determinative factors for mutual recognition of criminal 
judgments are not bright-line rules that can be applied after the fact. Rather, 
many come in the form of unwritten prerequisites for an agreement to 
recognize and enforce criminal judgments, such as reciprocity, comity, and 
confidence in the essential justice of the other system, all qualities that are 
absent here.   
Finally, a general international consensus has developed in favor of 
validating the desire of the parties to choose foreign courts, arbitration 
tribunals, and out-of-court settlements to resolve their civil disputes. This 
consensus provides some normative imperative for recognizing the civil 
judgments of alternative tribunals so long as the parties have participated 
willingly in the process. There is, however, no such consensus in the world of 
criminal law. Agreements to recognize foreign criminal judgments for 
purposes of enforcement, or to bar future prosecutions, are few and far 
between; momentum to create such agreements exists only between states that 
have established common minimum standards for procedural protections and 
have an interest in eventually achieving a unified legal system. Accordingly, 
there is no similar normative consensus concerning the value or 
appropriateness of recognizing foreign criminal decisions, particularly in 
settings where procedural or substantive protections are in doubt. 
One might question whether such a divided approach is workable in 
practice, particularly should joint criminal-civil cases come before the courts. 
However, as described above, civil and criminal judgments are subject to 
different standards for recognition and enforcement under most legal systems. 
In this sense, Kosovo’s dual modes of analysis would not be peculiar, but 
rather would be in accord with the practices of the other jurisdictions with 
which Kosovo interacts, in particular the European Union and the United 
States. Furthermore, most civil and criminal claims for recognition and 
enforcement of judgments will come before the courts in very different 
contexts: from a party seeking enforcement or non-enforcement in the civil 
context, and from a prosecutor filing new charges against a defendant 
previously tried in the criminal context. In those few instances in which the 
two overlap, for example if a plaintiff sought to enforce a civil judgment 
granted on the basis of a criminal conviction, the exceptions to the civil 
judgments default rule of recognition would provide a sufficient basis for 
examining the merits of the claim.   
 Looking beyond Kosovo, situations of legal pluralism with ambiguous 
patterns of judgment recognition and enforcement are common to other states 
with sharp ethnic and religious divisions, whether in post-conflict settings or 
in more ordinary times. What principles or determinative factors do Kosovo’s 
situation and the legal models reviewed here suggest for other states with 
multiple, conflicting court systems? This is a subject that deserves exploring 
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in its own right, particularly when presented, as it is here, as a question of 
transitional justice for a post-conflict state. I can offer here some preliminary 
thoughts as to the issues that should be taken into account in determining 
whether and how to recognize the judgments of alternative systems. 
(i) Political, Economic and Social Concerns 
What are the political, economic and social incentives for recognition or 
non-recognition, such as implications for sovereignty, non-recognition of 
judgments as a barrier to efficient economic markets and social interchange, 
or the existence of overlapping claims to property? In the examples 
considered above, states have adopted models favoring broad and swift 
recognition of judgments when they have important economic and social ties 
to other states that will benefit from mutual recognition between the systems. 
In contrast, if there is little economic or social interaction, or if there are 
fundamental political issues such as sovereignty at stake, the political 
drawbacks to automatic recognition of judgments may outweigh any social or 
economic benefits. 
In the same vein, can the relevant political questions be separated from 
the legal questions? While in Kosovo the political issue of sovereignty could 
be bypassed in civil cases but not in criminal cases, in other states sovereignty 
may be a less acute issue. This would be the case, for example, if the 
alternative court is part of an indigenous group with some degree of 
recognized sovereignty. Alternatively, in formally divided states like Cyprus 
or in states where the alternative institution operates only in discrete areas 
such as the Zapatista courts in Mexico, distinctions in recognition based on 
territorial jurisdiction may allow states to elide the problem of sovereignty. 
(This distinction is in fact suggested by Kosovo’s criminal procedure code, 
although it is not applicable to the territorially diffuse Serbian parallel 
courts).211 
Finally, is there sufficient trust between the systems to serve as a basis 
for reciprocity and comity? Are there ways of reliably transferring information 
between the systems that could facilitate such practices? No matter how 
appropriate the adopted rules for recognition and enforcement of judgments 
may be, they will be effective only if applied in good faith and with a 
reasonable degree of good will. 
(ii) Correspondence to Existing Legal Models  
Do the existing legal models provide determinative factors for decision-
making that address the particular issues raised by the alternative system? 
Here, in the civil cases, there was a well elaborated set of grounds for non-
recognition that is relevant to the crucial issues at stake in Kosovo. In the 
criminal cases, in contrast, most models relied on pre-existing protections for 
defendants’ rights and so did not provide particular factors addressing the core 
concern of sham or discriminatory proceedings. 
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What are the principles upon which the legal legitimacy of the relevant 
judgments is based? In the examples considered above, judgments based on 
the consent of the parties are more susceptible to rules favoring recognition 
than judgments based on sovereignty, because states treat the parties’ consent 
as mitigating some of the fairness concerns that might otherwise compel 
greater scrutiny of the relevant judgment or proceedings. If consent is 
relevant, is there a reliable way of systematically confirming the parties’ 
consent to participate in the alternative system? If the parties’ consent can be 
presumed in most cases, this may provide a basis for a default rule in favor of 
recognition. 
(iii) Areas of Convergence and Divergence 
To what extent do the legal systems at issue converge or diverge? In 
Kosovo, there is quite a bit of convergence in the procedures and rules of the 
two systems due to their shared history.  
Also, are there identifiable subcategories of cases that raise problems 
that are different or more complex than other subcategories, such as the 
property cases in Kosovo? Can these subcategories be readily divided from 
the others and treated as a discrete category? In Kosovo’s case, isolating the 
contentious category of property cases should permit other civil matters to be 
addressed more easily. 
(iv) Fairness v. Certainty 
What are the fundamental fairness concerns at stake in this situation? If 
there are systemic injustices that are internal to the alternative system and that 
exist independently of any interaction with other systems, this tends to militate 
toward non-recognition—or at least toward careful scrutiny—of an alternative 
system’s decisions, depending on the severity of the problems, how pervasive 
they are, and whether they are confined to a subcategory of cases. Automatic 
recognition of essentially unfair decisions would only exacerbate the problem 
presented by the existence of the alternative system by increasing the scope of 
its decisions’ influence. On the other hand, an alternative system could be 
essentially fair and internally consistent, but injustices may be created by 
conflicts between the systems—for example, by conflicting judgments on the 
same matter. If so, this tends to argue for general recognition of the alternative 
system’s cases, or at least certain subcategories of those cases, as such 
recognition will itself help to prevent injustices from arising. 
Finally, do the relevant fairness concerns exacerbate existing social 
problems, especially those that gave rise to the division in the court systems in 
the first place, such as inter-ethnic conflict or discrimination? If so, this tends 
to increase the significance of the fairness concerns vis-à-vis other values such 
as promoting economic efficiency. These interactions between the legal and 
social issues should also be taken into account in considering the mechanism 
used to address the decisions—for example, by identifying sub-categories of 
alternative cases involving inter-ethnic issues that should receive special 
treatment. 
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(v) Designing the Framework 
The legal models discussed above also suggest mechanisms for 
calibrating a recognition framework to take account of particular 
circumstances and concerns. For example, in the civil context, where the 
models share a fairly uniform default rule favoring recognition, there are 
nonetheless substantial differences in the rule as applied. In practice, states 
must decide whether to have an automatic or case-by-case recognition 
process; the grounds for non-enforcement; whether to focus on the parties’ 
agreement to use the alternative system or on the fairness of the proceedings 
themselves; and the level of judicial discretion. By making calculated choices 
on these crucial factors, states can subject judgments to greater or lesser 
scrutiny and establish corresponding levels of certainty and predictability.  
Kosovo’s Provisional Criminal Procedure Code suggests another alternative 
approach, readily recognizing and enforcing judgments in which the state has 
a lesser interest, while subjecting those in which the state’s interest is high to 
greater scrutiny. 
These issues, of course, are not the only ones at stake, either in Kosovo 
or in other transitioning and divided states. Nor can legal models be expected 
to trump all political concerns. Ultimately, the future of Kosovo’s parallel 
court systems will depend, like the fate of Kosovo itself, on the ongoing 
negotiations over Kosovo’s political status. But whether and how to recognize 
its past judgments is a legal question that can best be resolved by recourse to 
the available legal models, leaving the larger political question of sovereignty 
to the politicians. 
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